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ABSTRACT
About a decade has passed since the public-private partnership became popular in the US. Before
such a partnership became popular, the public and private sectors confronted one another rather
than cooperated. In conducting the same downtown development, the two sectors mixed little;
the public sector began preparing the site without consulting the private sector, and then the
private sector constructed a building on the site without discussing how to use it with the public
sector. However, this practice has been changing as the two sectors realized that the conventional
way of development would not work well anymore. Recently, both sectors have often been
involved in all stages of projects, negotiating with one another throughout the development
process. This cooperation of the two sectors is usually referred to as the public-private
partnership.
A recent phenomenon, the public-private partnership became popular not only in the US but also
in other major countries. Japan is no exception, and the public-private partnership has attracted
very wide attention. Interestingly, however, what is known as the public-private partnership in
Japan seems to be slightly different from that in the US. The main theme of this thesis is to
clarify how the partnerships in the US and in Japan are different, and why such differences have
occurred.
This thesis first examines the economical and political factors that helped the public-private
partnership get attention in Japan. Then, how these factors worked in forming the Japanese-style
partnership will be discussed. The middle of the thesis documents a case study that was
conducted to better understand the uniqueness of the public-private partnership as seen in Japan.
Finally, after clarifying problems of the Japanese partnership, some suggestions will be made to
seek a better relationship among parties that will be involved in future projects.
Several conclusions are drawn from the study. One is that a project competition, a method
employed in the studied case, contains problems in order to be solved to maintain a good
partnership between the two sectors. Notably, the competition jury played an important role to
fix such problems in the studied case. The second relates to how to maintain the public purpose
for the public sector in conducting a project with the private sector. The importance of inviting
citizen groups to development projects is also pointed out in the conclusion.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title: Professor of City Planning, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter I
Conceptual Differences between the Public-Private
Partnership in Japan and in the US
1. Introduction
To study the public-private partnership as found in Japan, one needs to know that
the basic concept in Japan is slightly different from that understood in the US. In Japan,
such a partnership is not an inevitable result but a way for the public sector to utilize
private funds and expertise. To understand this, I would like to introduce what a public-
private partnership means in the US. Then, the movement that motivated the public
sector in Japan to form a partnership with the private sector will be explained. Finally,
the Japanese concept will be compared to that of the US to further understand the
essential difference between the two.
2. Concepts of the Public-Private Partnership in the US
About ten years have passed since the term "public-private partnership" became
popular in the US. Despite its recent introduction, the term is now used both nationally
and internationally. It is not a term with a single definition, however, but has been used
to refer broadly to a wide variety of interactions between public and private organizations.
To study the Japanese public-private partnership, I would like first to establish a broad
understanding of what public-private partnership means in the US.
Until the present time, many people have expressed their own interpretations of
public-private "partnership." However, no definition has been definitive, and the range
of meaning for the term seems to be unlimited. For example, the Committee for
Economic Development, US committee for governmental studies, stated in 1982, "public-
private partnership is cooperation among individuals and organizations in the public and
private sectors for mutual benefit."' In 1989, Scott Fosler, senior fellow at the Johns
Hopkins University, interpreted that statement as, "relationship among government,
business, and/or non-profit organizations, ranging from informal understandings ... to
formal joint agreements ..., that provide mutual benefits both to the public and private
participants."2 Here, and in any other cases, the term "public-private partnership" refers
to a broad concept, and it includes any style of interaction between the two sectors.
Efforts have been made, however, to break down the concept into categories.
Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn, professors at MIT, classified these partnerships in
two categories according to the level of the public sector's commitment.3  The first
category includes partnerships at the decision-sharing level. This category was frequently
seen in the early years, i.e., in the early 1980's, and includes any partnership where the
public sector makes crucial decisions together with private companies. For this purpose,
the public sector usually invites private developers, for instance, to become involved in
the early stage of project planning, and continues to negotiate with them as circumstances
change. The public sector, however, does not share the risks that may accompany a
project. It remains merely a regulator rather than a developer under this category. The
second category includes partnerships at the joint-venture level. Under this category, the
public sector works like a developer, sharing both future returns and project risks with
private developers. Therefore, it may suffer from financial problems as well as political
ones in case of any failure during the project. Also, the public sector often plays an
important role not only in design and finance but also in ownership and management, a
significant difference when compared to the first category.
Scott Fosler categorized partnerships differently, basing his divisions on the form
of their origins: from (1) government initiatives, (2) private sector initiatives, and (3) joint
government-private sector activities.4 In his first category, government initiatives, the
government usually sets the rules that control private real estate development, and private
developers sometimes influence those rules to make them fit ongoing business
circumstances. In the second category, private sector initiatives, private developers
choose to undertake development that has an explicit public purpose as one of its goals.
Government may not be directly involved in development under this second category.
In the third category, joint government-private sector activities, the government works
together with private developers on a specific goal common to both. The arrangements
between them vary case by case, from informal agreements to formally established joint
organizations.
Having reviewed these definitions, I would like to define public-private partnership
as a collaboration between government and private entities through which resources,
expertise, and personnel are pooled, and effort, risk, and benefit are shared. This
definition may be rather narrow compared to a generally accepted one, in that it requires
government to become something more than a regulator. However, I think that both
sectors need to assume an equal level of risk and responsibility if they want to maintain
a good relationship, even after a project is done. Keeping this view in mind, I would like
to describe the public-private partnership as known in Japan and explain how it has
evolved.
3. "Minkatsu," Its Concept and Background
The evolution of public-private partnerships in Japan has been greatly influenced
by "Minkatsu," a unique idea introduced to public organizations in the early 1980's.
Minkatsu is an abbreviation of the Japanese phrase "Minkan Katsuryoku." The
first word, Minkan, means "private" or "civil," and the second word, Katsuryoku, means
"vitality" or "energy." The word Minkatsu, therefore, means something like "the vitality
of private companies." This translation is, however, rather superficial. The actual
meaning of Minkatsu is more than what the term literally means. It refers to the situation
where government utilizes private companies' vitality in the form of funds, business
skills, and experienced personnel, in order to promote public enterprises.
Minkatsu was first contrived by the Second Ad Hoc Administrative Review
Commission, a supervisory commission to Japanese Government, in its third report on
administrative reform in 1982. This new concept was intended to be a way to deal with
problems that public organizations were experiencing. The de facto bankruptcy of the
Japanese National Railways clarified the necessity of establishing a more efficient
administrative system to revive public enterprises that had become inflexible and seemed
not to be functioning properly. One way to reform would be to utilize private companies'
expertise.
Several economic and social conditions, however, made Minkatsu an attractive
option in the field of urban development, too. First, public facilities such as roads, parks,
civic halls, and convention centers, were poor in Japan, compared with those in other
industrialized countries, and the government, at both national and local levels, was eager
to improve them. Table 1-1 explains how public facilities were poorly equipped in Japan.
For example, the extent of highways was 8.3 kilometers per 1,000 cars in 1985, less than
a quarter of that in the US in 1981. Parks in Tokyo were 2.0 square meters per capita
in 1981, surprisingly less than one twenty-second of those in Washington D.C. in 1976.'
As the rate of economic growth had slowed down and the rate of elderly people had risen,
it was expected that the government would be short of funds for such public facilities,
since it would be required to save them for social welfare. The coming decade was
therefore thought to be the last chance to equip these facilities sufficiently.
Table 1-1: International Comparison of Urban Infrastructure
Japan US West Germany UK
Highways 8.3 37.5 30.6 16.3
(km / 1,000 cars) (1985) (1981) (1981) (1981)
Parks 2.0 (1981) 45.7 (1976) 51.0 (1980) 33.0 (1981)
(m2 / capita) (Tokyo) (Wash. D.C.) (Bonn) (London)
Sewers 34 72 89 98
(% of pop. covered) (1985) (1977) (1979) (1981)
Source: Construction Ministry of Japan
Second, the financial strength of the government at both national and local levels
was weakened, preventing it from conducting urban development by itself. It was
suffering from both annual deficits and a high burden of accumulated debts. In the early
1970's, tax revenues were depressed by economic stagnation, and the government failed
to curb expenditure to make both ends meet. Typically, the national government issued
bonds to cover over 30% of total expenditure in the late 1970's. Although the percentage
of the debt has declined from its peak of 34.7% in 1979, it has remained at a high level
thereafter.' Compared to the debts of other countries, the fiscal deficit of Japan was much
more serious, as shown in Table 1-2. From 1975 to 1980, Japan increased its fiscal
deficit by 10%, whereas the US and West Germany reduced theirs by the same amount
in the same period. Due to these large annual deficits, Japan had accumulated national
debts of about 70,510 billion yen (US$ 311 billion) Footnote 1 by 1980. This debt was equal
to 28.8% of the nominal Gross National Product. As a result, government expenditure
was limited, and allocation of funds lost flexibility, which meant that the government
could not adequately invest in public works even though they wanted to improve urban
facilities.
Table 1-2: International Comparison of Fiscal Deficit
Year 1970 1975 1980
Japan (Billion Yen) 80 4,670 13,530
% of Fiscal Size 0.9% 22.4% 31.2%
% of Nominal GNP 0.1% 3.0% 5.7%
US (Billion Dollars) 11 85 68
% of Fiscal Size 5.6% 23.3% 11.3%
% of Nominal GNP 1.1% 5.5% 2.6%
West Germany (Billion Marks) +10 35 28
% of Fiscal Size +1.2% 22.0% 12.8%
% of Nominal GNP +0.2% 3.4% 1.8%
Source: NLI Research Institute
Third, the private sector in Japan had surplus funds at that time. The monetary
relaxation in the 1980's provided the opportunity for private companies to raise huge
amounts of funds at low cost, and the total amount of funds actually raised was more than
the opportunities for real investment, i.e., plant/equipment investment and inventory
investment. A large part of the surplus funds was reinvested in stocks, thus increasing
the financial assets of the private sector to as high as 434 trillion yen (US$ 3.03 trillion)
1 The exchange rate used is 226.74 yen = US$ 1.00, the average rate of 1980.
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Footnote 2 by 1989. Since the private sector had more funds in hand than the amount
necessary for real investment, it looked for extra investment opportunities, one of which
was urban development. Minkatsu was, so to say, an attempt by the public sector to
utilize such surplus funds from the private sector.
Fourth, Japan was experiencing international economic friction due to its huge
trade surplus, and was being requested to stimulate its domestic market in order to
balance exports and imports. Japan's real economic growth rate averaged 4.4% yearly
between 1975 and 1982, which was much higher than the growth rate of other countries.
Actually, the US grew at 2.2% and West Germany at 1.8% in the same period. Japan's
relatively rapid growth, based in part on exports, was somehow undesirable from the
diplomatic point of view because it might aggravate the economic friction between Japan
and countries suffering from large trade deficits. Japan's annual trade surplus in 1985
was 10,871 billion yen (US$ 45.533 billion), Footnote 3 and 85% of that surplus was from
trade with the US. Since the Japanese economy was growing faster than that of other
developed countries, the US demanded that Japan stimulate its domestic economy to
increase imports. Because of their high multiplying effects, construction-related projects,
such as urban development, got special attention and were highly promoted, with
government taking the initiative.
Minkatsu was originally a way to solve the administrative problems that public
organizations faced. During the Nakasone administration (1982-1987), however, it was
applied to various fields, one of which was urban development, and brought about a
2 The exchange rate used is 143.45 yen = US$ 1.00, the rate prevailing at the end of 1989.
3 The exchange rate used is 238.54 yen = US$ 1.00, the average rate of 1985.
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remarkable phenomenon to Japan's real estate industry. That was the Japanese public-
private partnership.
4. Brief Comparison of Public-Private Partnerships, as Practiced in Japan and in the US
There is a large difference one needs to remember when comparing Japanese
public-private partnerships with those in the US. This difference is deeply rooted in the
background in which the concept has evolved. Public-private partnerships appeared with
the commencement of Minkatsu in Japan, whereas in the US they appeared with the
discontinuance of the urban renewal program. The public sector in Japan, therefore, has
considered partnership to be basically a way to utilize the private sector's funds, whereas
in the US it has considered partnership a way to save blighted areas after losing urban
renewal funds. Before discussing the case study, I would like to show why such a
difference has occurred, explaining several urban agendas in each country.
Two important issues to be addressed are the land-price system and the population
movement. Traditionally, land price depends more on use in the US, whereas in Japan
it depends more on location, i.e., proximity to downtown or a railway station. In
appraising a parcel of land with a building on it, land and building are usually appraised
together in the US,' while they are usually appraised separately in Japan. Hence, in Japan
land price is determined regardless of current use; this practice implies that a blighted
area hardly exists downtown because downtown space is almost always considered
precious and convenient. In the US, on the other hand, proximity to downtown is not
necessarily considered an advantage. This was especially true in the 1960's - 1970's.
The downtown population had declined in both Japan and the US for different
reasons. In the US, the middle to high income class preferred to live in a suburb or a
small town, and "cities were turning into an ungovernable, out of control, unloved,
unlivable, and frightening places."9 Downtown development therefore had been risky
business, and many large parcels were left unused, like St. Paul's Superhole and St.
Louis's Hiroshima Flats. Neither sector could revive such cities without forming some
kind of partnership.
Some US cities made generous deals with private developers and assumed some
risks, getting out of their conventional position as regulator. The main reasons for the
changes were: (1) the restructuring of urban economies in the 1970's, (2) the abrogation
by the federal government of the urban renewal program in 1974, and (3) the fiscal crisis
caused by taxpayers' initiatives.' After the oil shock in 1973, the growth of disposable
personal income slowed down and traditional industries began to show poor performance.
38 million people were unemployed, and people at large wanted the public sector to
stimulate industry and employment. Also, after the approval of the tax-limiting
Proposition 13 in California in 1973, referendums that would limit tax-collection and
governmental expenditure were proposed in many states, which continued by the mid
1980's. This meant that many local governments' tax revenues decreased while they were
prevented from obtaining new tax bases. The abrogation of the urban renewal program
was a prelude to the federal government's reduction of financial support to local
governments. This implied that local governments would have to raise funds necessary
for development by themselves. Robert Lurcott, who actually dealt with public-private
development in the city of Pittsburgh in the 1980's, summarized as follows:
"Because of the relative loss of real estate value in central cities,
downtown land had become less attractive for private investment. Also,
government subsidies were less available. All of this meant that the
potential private partners needed assurances of maximum cooperation and
a minimum of hassle from government to offset the reduced attractiveness.
Local governments had to attract private investment to offset the loss of
tax base. Therefore, they were willing to commit to a cooperative rather
than an adversarial relationship with private developers that was more
typical of the traditional "regulator" role."11
On the other hand, the downtown population decline in Japan occurred for
different reasons. It occurred mainly because of high demand for office space, which was
triggered by the internationalization of the Tokyo market, driving away downtown
residents. As Tokyo became one of the most internationally important cities, many
foreign companies began to open their branches in Tokyo. For instance, the number of
foreign security companies located in Tokyo more than doubled in two years, from 22 in
1985 to 47 in 1987.12 A significant office increase based on these trends displaced
residential units, reducing the downtown population.
Under such circumstances, private developers could redevelop downtown without
forming a partnership with the public sector. One of the reasons for forming the
partnership was that the public sector had large parcels that were conveniently located.
Landfills were typical examples. The public sector had landfills that, while being close
to downtown, were not fully developed with proper infrastructure. The public sector
wanted to develop such lands to cope with problems it faced: thickly built and
continuously growing downtowns. On the other hand, private developers were also
interested in public lands. If adequate facilities, especially transportation facilities, were
equipped, such places would become convenient, and the land price would probably
become high enough to compensate development costs. Again, however, forming a
partnership with private developers was just an option for the public sector to utilize
abundant funds.
Summarily, large cities in Japan generally encountered the problem of a
continuously growing downtown area. Furthermore, infrastructure, such as roads, parks,
and water/sewers, were poorly equipped there. The public sector in Japan therefore used
public-private partnership as a method to expand urban areas in order to properly control
city growth" rather than to revive deteriorated areas. For an instant comparison,
simplified social phenomena in both countries are summarized in Table 1-4.
Table 1-4: Comparison of Background between Japan and the US
Japan US
Population 118 million 232 million
Land Area 370,000 km2  9,360,000 km2
% of Area Inhabitable 24 % 44 %
Density in Inhabitable 1,450 persons/km2  55 persons/km2
Area
Historical Urbaniza- -How to utilize limited land for -How to develop vast land with
tion Process large population limited number of people
Urban Transportation -Mass transportation society -Car oriented society
Business Function -Concentration of business -Suburbanization of business
function into CBD function from CBD
Space Demand in -High demand of business -High/middle income group and
CBD space CBD pushing business facilities moving out
residents out of downtown of downtown
Land Price -Extraordinarily high land price -Drop down of land price in
In downtown downtown vicinity
Urban Problems -Middle income group forced -Low income group trapped in
to live in remote areas downtown
-Commuting jam -Deterioration
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Chapter II
Several Tips to Better Understand
the Omiya Sonic City Project
1. Tips to be Explained
I think that the Omiya Sonic City project is a good example to study how the
public and private sectors reach agreements in Japan. I also think that, through this
project, the two sectors clarified several issues to be addressed in order to form a better
partnership in the future.
Since the Sonic City is not a US case, it may be a good idea to explain issues that
are not necessarily obvious to those who are not familiar with Japan. Also, providing
some preliminary information will be helpful to better understand the project. In this
chapter, I will begin the overview of the Sonic City project by showing its basic structure.
Then, I would like to explain the history of the city and the area in which the Sonic City
now stands, with a quick view of what the city government originally intended to do in
that area. Since this project was promoted by the prefectural government eventually, what
materialized was slightly different from the city government's original intent. Finally, I
would like to explain methods that were popular to promote Minkatsu projects at the time.
It is important to know pros and cons of such methods because a new method was
invented through the project to overcome major problems of the conventional methods.
2. Overview of the Omiya Sonic City
The Sonic City is the nickname of the Industry and Culture Center, a mixed-use
complex constructed and managed by both public and private sectors. The term "Sonic"
stands for the initial letters of each organization concerned plus the function of the
buildings, i.e., Saitama Omiya NLI Industrial and Cultural center. While the Saitama
Prefectural Government took the initiative in the project, some other players, both public
and private, were also deeply involved in the project. The Omiya City Government
owned the largest lot on the project site. It was conducting a development project in the
area according to its original development plan. Nippon Life Insurance Company (NLI)
and Fujita Corporation (Fujita) jointly proposed a development plan to the prefectural
government and were designated as developers of this project.
The Sonic City was completed in 1988 and was located about 300 meters west of
Omiya Station, the main station in the area. It consists of three large buildings--an office
tower, a hotel, and a city hall. The office tower is the first highrise in the north of Tokyo
with 31 stories above ground and 4 stories underground. It houses public office space
and private office space. The prefectural government owns the public office space and
uses it as offices for public organizations, a passport center, meeting rooms, and
convention halls. NLI owns the private office space and uses it as offices for private
companies and a showroom. NLI also owns a hotel building and rents it to a first-class
hotel company based in Tokyo. The city hall is owned by the prefectural government and
houses one of the largest multi-purpose halls in Japan. In front of the buildings is a park
of 6,750 n2 where citizens usually enjoy lunch at noon and date in the evening. A
second-story-level pedestrian deck was constructed simultaneously with the Sonic City
to connect it with the station and surrounding large buildings. This deck enabled people
to safely travel between the station and the Sonic City despite very narrow street-level
sidewalks.
In promoting the project, the prefectural government invited private companies to
become involved. This was because the government felt uneasy about construction
fund-raising, estimated to be over 30 billion yen (US$ 150 million), Footnote 1 tenant
recruitment, and building management. Methods that were popular at the time to invite
private companies were rejected for various reasons. The prefectural government finally
invented a new method for this project, an equivalent exchange method that would allow
the exchange of the land lease title and building ownership.
Using this method, the prefectural government first leased the prefectural land to
NLI. Then, NLI constructed buildings on the leased land at its own cost. Finally, the
prefectural government purchased the necessary portion of the buildings upon their
completion by exchanging the land lease title for the building portion. Since both parties
exchange properties of equivalent value, this method is called the "equivalent exchange
method." Through such an exchange, the prefectural government and NLI became joint
property owners and were required to form a long-term partnership to manage them.
The Sonic City project has several distinctive features. First, the prefectural
government invented a finance plan for itself. The government originally had to pay
12,371 million yen (US$ 62 million) to purchase the public portion. However, the actual
amount paid was 7,713 million yen (US$ 38 million), because 5,091 million yen (US$25
million) was paid by NLI to the prefectural government in order to obtain the land lease
Footnote 2
title, and this was used as part of the prefectural government's payment.
The designation of the developer was also unique, because a project competition
was conducted. The prefectural government announced the competition terms in 1984
The exchange rate used is 200.50 yen = US$ 1.00, the rate prevailing at the end of 1985.
This rate will be used hereafter, unless otherwise specified.
2 In a land lease transaction in Japan, the lessee generally pays 70-80% of the land value
to the lessor at the beginning of the lease in order to obtain the land lease title, and then annually
pays 2-3% of the land value as ground rents.
and invited project proposals which must cover a wide range of plans from design to
management stages. Among the proposals submitted, the prefectural government selected
NLI/Fujita's proposal as the best and designated them to be the developer of the project.
Since the prefectural government employed a method that was so unique in Japan at the
time, it was called the "Saitama Method," named after the prefecture that promoted the
project.
Figure 2-1: The Omiya Sonic City
Table 2-1: Outline of the Omiya Sonic City
Location Omiya City, Saitama Prefecture
Year of Completion 1988
Project Scale Land Area: 22,334 m2
Floor Area: 124,945 m2 (31-story office tower, hotel, and city hall)
Floor Area Office Tower and Hotel City Hall
109,666 m2  15,279 m2
Public Portion 16,404 m2  15,279 m2
Public Organization Offices Main Hall (2,505 seats)
Passport Center Auxiliary Hall (496 seats)
Meeting Rooms International Conference Room
Convention Halls
Parking (87 spaces)
Private Portion 61,247 in2
Office (32,148 mn2)
Hotel (19,903 m2 )
Retail (1,637 m2 )
Parking (7,559 in 2 , 204 spaces)
Common Portion 32,015 n2
Each Party's Roles Land Ownership: Saitama Prefectural Government
Omiya City Government
Nippon Life Insurance Company (lease)
Construction Work: Fujita Corporation
Building Ownership: Saitama Prefectural Government
Nippon Life Insurance Company
Bldg Management: Saitama Foundation for Culture and Industry
Omiya Sonic City Corporation
Finance Plan Total Construction Cost: 36.3 billion yen (US$ 180 million)
While the prefectural government had to pay 12.4 billion yen to
purchase the public portion, it actually paid 7.7 billion yen by
appropriating 5 billion yen of the land lease title fee. It would also
receive 140-million-yen ground rents annually from NLI.
Source: Saitama Foundation for Culture and Industry, et al.
The West Gate Area before Development
The West Gate Area
Figure 2-2:
Figure 2-3: after Development
3. History of Omiya City
Omiya City is located about 40 minutes from Tokyo Station via the Keihin-
Tohoku Line. Omiya is the largest city in Saitama Prefecture with 403,776 residents
(1990) and, and located about 30 kilometers north of the center of Tokyo, close enough
to commute there. Omiya is a transportation center with nine lines running through
Omiya Station, the regional core station. About 410,000 commuters, about the same
volume as the city population, get on and off trains at this station everyday.' Although
the prefectural government is in Urawa City, just south of Omiya, Omiya City is
regarded as the most important business center of the prefecture.
Figure 2-4: Omiya City
i Keihin-Tohoku Line
Omiya has a long history, having been founded over eight hundred years ago. The
name of the city, "Omiya," literally means a "large shrine." This is because the city was
founded as a shrine town.
After Japan abandoned its national isolation policy and became open to foreign
countries in the 1860's, Omiya began to grow as a railway town. Omiya Station was
completed in 1885 as the fifth station in the prefecture. Railway factories were
constructed in 1894 and promoted local employment. Since Omiya held an advantage in
railway transportation, many local businesses were established. Among them, textile,
Japan's main export at that time, became a large industry and led the city to be further
industrialized.
In 1940, the Town of Omiya was promoted to a city status, as the fifth city in the
prefecture. The population at that time was 59,740.2 The Central Business District of the
city was stretching to the east, from Omiya Station to the Hikawa Shrine, the largest
shrine in the city. The west side of the station was, however, in very messy shape. What
could be seen were rows of wooden houses that were densely built, railway company
dormitories, shabby bars, and a small shrine dedicated for railway transportation safety.
This situation continued until the Sonic City was constructed in this area.
In 1955, Omiya annexed six adjacent villages and became the largest city in the
prefecture. By this annexation, the city formed the current administrative district and
increased the population to 148,016, almost 2.5 times larger than that of 15 years before.
Omiya was selected as an area in which development would be highly encouraged by the
Metropolitan Area Development Law of 1959, and a number of housing and industrial
developments were promoted one after another. These developments were for the greater
Tokyo Metropolitan area as well as for local communities, and Omiya gradually assumed
the function of Tokyo's bed-town. Although these developments helped department stores
and retail shops establish themselves in Omiya's downtown, its main industry was still
manufacturing rather than office-related tertiary industry. With JNR-related factories
dominating its industry, Omiya had remained a railway town for a long time.
Omiya grew remarkably until the 1970's, when Japan experienced the world-wide
oil shocks. The population in 1975 was 328,914. This means that the city population had
more than doubled in twenty years without annexation. As the population grew, the
Densely Inhabited District (DID) also expanded. Footnote 3 In 1960, only 14% of the
administrative district was the DID, and 66% of the population lived there. In 1975,
however, 37% of the administrative district became the DID, and 74% of the population
lived there. This means that Omiya's DID got crowded year by year. The population
density of the entire city was 3,687 persons per square kilometer in 1975,3 almost the
same density as recent Washington D.C., which was 3,819 persons per square kilometer
(1990).4 Within the DID, the population density was much higher. It was 7,491 persons
per square kilometer in 1975, almost 40% of that of Manhattan Borough, although most
buildings were less than three stories in Omiya.
As Omiya grew, the environmental gap became clear between the east and west
sides of the station. The east side was thriving. Most people came from the east side of
the station to get on trains in the morning and exited out to the same side in the evening.
Most retail shops, restaurants, and financial institutions were also located in the east side
3 The Densely Inhabited District is a concept to provide urban area boundaries, invented
in Japan in 1960. It consists of census survey districts where over 4,000 persons inhabit per
square kilometer.
area. The west side looked very shabby, on the contrary. Roads were narrow and
winding. Many were unpaved. Houses were small and unhygienic. Built of wood, they
were also dangerous in case of fire.
After the oil shocks, the structure of Omiya's industry somewhat changed. The
manufacturing industry stopped growing both in terms of the amount of sales and the
number of employees. Then, the tertiary industry such as wholesale, retail, and service-
providing businesses flourished. Nonetheless, Omiya was not regarded as a regional core
yet. It was still a bed-town. According to official statistics, 54% of workers and students
over 15 years old commuted out of the city everyday. More interestingly, 29% of
workers and students commuted to Tokyo.'
4. The West Gate Area and the Omiya City Government's Plan of the Area
When the prefectural government announced a development plan of the Sonic City
in 1983, the west gate area, an area just west of the station, was still underdeveloped
despite a land readjustment project that the city government had conducted. Footnote 4
The city government decided on the land readjustment of the west gate area in
1963. At that time, the area was just like a backdoor leading to railway-related factories.
The west side station square was poorly equipped. Exiting the station to the west, one
could see nothing but rows of shabby bars hanging a red paper-lantern called "Aka-
4 Land readjustment is a method to equip public facilities, such as roads and parks, without
raising special funds for it. Through a land readjustment project, every lots in the project area
will be replaced and standardized in shape, which will bring the appreciation of the land price in
the area. With an expectation of such appreciation, the project will be conducted, in many cases,
by a public organization.
Chochin" in the front. Footnote 5 There were about 70 bars, which had settled during the
chaos of the post World War II period. Most roads were privately owned, narrow and
winding. Residential buildings were old and small, looking like tenement houses. Over
70% of them were less than 100 in 2. There were about 500 houses that seemed to be
superannuated in front of the station.
The west gate area was rather vast, therefore the city government divided the land
readjustment project into two phases. The Phase I area was just west of the station. The
main objective of the Phase I project was to construct a large station square and wide
roads that would connect the station square with a principal road running nearby. The
Phase II area was where the Sonic City now strands, and the main objective was to
construct access roads and large open space for resident nearby.
To proceed with the Phase I project, the city government began to purchase lots
in 1969. However, the land readjustment was not easy. This was because many people
owned lots in the area. What worse, most lots were very tiny. Many land owners
expressed their anxieties about whether they could remain in the area even after the land
readjustment project. According to an official report, the number of people who had any
right in the area was 432.6 The number of lots was 428, though the area was as small as
68,600 m2 .
In 1971, Japanese National Railways announced that new super-express lines
would be constructed through Omiya city. This made the landowners' attitudes somewhat
cooperative. They began to study and make plans that would suit their interests. Since
many lots were tiny, with most being smaller than 165 in2, the city government planned
An aka-chochin is the marker for a dive bar in Japan.
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to assemble lots into one large parcel. Then, the government wanted the landholders to
collectively construct a large building on it.' Although 53 people expressed opposing
opinions in 1978, the city government relentlessly conducted the land readjustment
project, sometimes enforcing eminent domain. The house demolitions began in 1979, and
many bars had to move out. Some of them moved to temporary stall-like structures
offered in the Phase II area to continue their business.
The land assembly in the Phase II area was rather easy compared to that in the
Phase I area. This was because most lots were publicly or semi-publicly owned. The
city government owned the largest lots, on which an elementary school stood. The
prefectural government owned a chamber-of-commerce site, and Japanese National
Railways, a semi-public corporation, owned a shrine site. The only private company in
the area had a bank site.
Neighbors were generally favorable to the Phase II land readjustment project. This
was because the area seemed lifeless at a pitch-dark school ground at night. They also
thought that the school might be one of the reasons why the west gate area was
underdeveloped. The location of the school was not desirable from the educational point
of view, too. Since many dive bars were around, pupils were always subjected to an
unfavorable influence. The city government was not quite sure how to use the site after
the elementary school moved, however. It intended to use the site as an open space like
a park, though such an idea was not confirmed. The city government could not decide
on the use of the site until the prefectural government asked for the construction of the
Sonic City on the site.
At the same time, the city government planned to construct a second-story-level
pedestrian deck in the west gate area. This plan was considered because the station had
to be expanded for new super-express lines opening in 1982. The station was planned
to have a large corridor that would connect both sides of the station. If the pedestrian
deck was well connected to this corridor, the pedestrians' mobility would be greatly
enhanced in the west gate area.
5. Minkatsu Methods Applied to Urban Development
It is not easy to fully explain Minkatsu methods applied to urban development,
because so many methods have been introduced under the name of Minkatsu. In the field
of urban development, however, many such methods are intended to assist private
enterprises in developments rather than to make the public sector become deeply involved
in them. Although the original Minkatsu idea was to reform the inflexibility of public
organizations, this idea has been amended somewhat to invite private companies to
development projects. To insure that the case study in the next chapter be well
understood, I would like to briefly explain four main methods applied to Minkatsu
projects.
The Minkatsu methods include deregulation of restrictions that have made urban
developments difficult; granting extra incentives to construct public facilities by private
development projects; establishment of third sector organizations to promote development
projects cooperatively by the public and private sectors; and effective utilization of
currently under-utilized government lands.' Obviously, these methods were invented by
the public sector as stimulants to invite the private sector to public enterprises to develop
urban areas that were less equipped with public facilities.
The main purpose of the deregulation and granting of extra incentives is to further
stimulate activities that private companies have conducted even before Minkatsu was
introduced. By doing so, the government has intended to construct public facilities, such
as roads, at private companies' cost. The government has not become involved in
projects but just removes impediments and provides incentives to private companies for
projects it wants to encourage. Therefore, if a category that the Committee of Economic
Development introduced is applied, these methods can be said as "government initiatives."
Deregulation became popular in Japan especially after 1982. Several zoning and
building permit restrictions were relaxed in 1982. This trend was stimulated by Prime
Minister Nakasone's statement that zoning should be changed so that buildings within the
Yamanote Line, a circular line with a radius of about 10 km surrounding Tokyo's central
area, could be higher than five stories. Many governmental committees were established,
and discussions of the effects of relaxing urban development-related restrictions on the
utilization of private funds took place. In the discussion, an increase in allowable FAR
got special attention and was considered one of the most effective methods to invite
private companies to participate in urban development. In 1986, the so-called "Minkatsu
Laws" were enacted in order to provide private developers with special assistance in
taxation and funding when they helped equip public facilities. Further, a new zoning
method was devised in 1988 which would enable local governments to more flexibly
specify land use than the existing zoning system.' By this method, local governments
became able to more freely negotiate with private developers because they obtained the
wider range of the authority to determine land use.
Extra incentives are given mainly in monetary form. An interest-free loan was
established in 1987 by using sales proceeds of the Nippon Telegram and Telephone
Company's stocks. This company was a public corporation. But, the national
government privatized it and sold its bonds to the public in the 1980's. The loan can be
available for up to 50% of construction costs of public facilities specified by the
government, with a repayment period of up to 15 years. By this loan, the government
intended to stimulate infrastructure construction while restraining its expenditure and bond
issuance.
The other two methods, the establishment of third sector organizations and the
utilization of under-utilized government lands were invented by the government to induce
private companies to public enterprises for which the government was originally
responsible. These methods require a much closer relationship between the two sectors
than do the aforementioned methods and therefore contain much opportunity to form a
public-private partnership.
A third sector organization is a company, usually a limited company, jointly
established by both the public and private sectors in terms of capital contribution and the
appointment of directors. There is no norm for public contribution to qualify as a third
sector organization, and the amount of public contribution is generally determined by the
level of business risk and commitment that the government wants to retain. By legal
requirement, however, if a local government has over 25% of total capital in a third sector
organization, this organization has to be supervised by the local government's special
committee. If a local government has over 50% of total capital, then this organization
has to report its business performance periodically to the local assembly in order to obtain
approval for such performance.' Although capital contribution ratios of third sector
organizations vary from case to case, local governments usually hold at least 25% of the
capital so that they can enjoy preferential measures in taxation, subsidies, and low- or no-
interest loans under the Minkatsu Law through such organizations. In 1990, the number
of third sector organizations of which the public sector's share was over 25% was more
than 800. About 30% of them were involved in urban development-related projects, such
as downtown development, regional development, and transportation systems construction.
The remaining 70% were involved in projects of leisure, tourism, agriculture, and
fisheries. Table 1-3 shows that the meaning of a third sector organization is rather
conceptual and it is recognized in many ways case by case.
Table 2-2: Definitions of Third Sector Organization
General Recognition A corporation that is founded jointly by the government (the
first sector) and a private enterprise (the second sector).
Home Affairs Ministry of Any organization founded pursuant to the Commercial Law
Japan regardless of whether it is a public corporation, association,
fund or limited company, as long as over 25% of the capital
was contributed by a single local government.
Governmental Requirement A corporation invested by a local government or a 100%
to use the NTT Interest-Free subsidiary of a local government.
Loan
Source: Regional Development, September 1991.
The original idea of a third sector organization was developed in the New National
Development Plan, the second nation-wide development plan of Japan, in 1969. This was
over ten years before the idea of Minkatsu was introduced. Then, the third sector
organization was re-recognized in the 1980's, as it was considered an ideal organization
for Minkatsu projects, endowed with the characteristics of the two sectors that would be
involved in partnerships.
In the early 1980's when the third sector organization became a recognized
performer in a Minkatsu project, the two sectors frequently established such organizations
expecting benefits as shown in Table 2-3.
Table 2-3: Merits Expected from Third Sector Organizations
Benefits for the Public Sector
- Large-scale development of the public purpose can be possible by using private sector
funds.
- Development risk accompanying large-scale development can be reduced because
private sector's expertise and business network are utilized from an early stage of
development.
- Development can be efficiently managed, utilizing the private sector's business
experiences and skilled personnel.
- The profitability of a project can be clearly assessed, because a third sector organization
is usually established to conduct only one project.
- The public sector can be released from annual budget restrictions.
Benefits for the Private Sector
- Land assembly can be relatively smooth because of the public sector's accountability
and the power of eminent domain.
- Administrative procedures may be smoothed. Extra incentives, such as an increase in
FAR, may also be granted.
- A positive company image may be created because of the public purpose of a project.
- Special taxation and loan measures may be available. For example, the NTT interest-
free loan is limited to third sector organizations, and pure private companies cannot use
it.
Although many benefits were expected from third sector organizations, the ones
that were actually established have shown several problems as well. First, the
responsibility of each sector tended to be unclear. Even though general agreements were
made concerning responsibilities--for instance the public sector would get official permits
necessary to development and the private sector would take care of financing--it would
not be clear who in the organization would be responsible for a specific matter. Most
people at third sector organizations were not employed by the organization itself, but sent
from its parent organizations. Since they were sent as part of a job rotation, they tended
to shirk their own responsibilities in order to go back to their original organizations
without making mistakes. Second, third sector organizations sometimes became
inefficient in running business because of administrative procedures that the government
had to fulfill. When the public sector had over 50% capital of a third sector organization,
the public sector had to report the business performance of such an organization for
approval. This practice significantly reduced the business flexibility of such
organizations.
Fortunately, several organizations succeeded in conquering these problems. For
example, a third sector organization that dealt with a ski area development in Tochigi
Prefecture, successfully clarified each sector's responsibility by deciding in advance to
switch the directorship at a certain stage of the project." While the project was under
construction, the director was a person from the public sector in order to effectively carry
out administrative matters. Then, when the project was coming to the completion, the
directorship switched to a person from a private company to deal with managerial matters.
In another case, a third sector organization changed the capital contribution ratio
according to the project stage for the same purpose. In the former stage, the public sector
had 80% of the total capital of the organization. Then, by purchasing all stocks
additionally issued, the private sector obtained 80% of the capital and became responsible
for running business in the latter stage.
Although several third sector organizations were successfully operated, many were
reported to have internal problems to some extent. And, it was generally recognized that
a third sector organization might not perfectly function as it was originally expected.
The last method of promoting Minkatsu projects is the effective utilization of
under-utilized government lands. This method is beneficial for the public sector, because
it may bring extra funds to the government if the government sells the land to private
companies. It also may stimulate the domestic construction market, thus expanding the
domestic demand at large. This is a situation that the government, especially the national
government, wants to achieve. The effective utilization of under-utilized government
lands is beneficial for the private sector, too. This is because it offers special
development opportunities that a private company would not achieve alone. The
government has much unused land at desirable locations for development. This incentive
therefore serves as impetus for inviting private companies into development projects for
public uses. The Sonic City project, which will be explained in the following chapters
in detail, was developed under this method.
In principle, the government land has to be used with a top priority for public use.
This idea had strictly prohibited the government from selling its lands. In 1983, however,
this restriction was relaxed to improve the government's financial deficits. The
government began to sell its lands at open bids. This practice brought the public sector
new funds as well as a serious problem. This was because open bids resulted in
triggering extraordinary appreciation of the surrounding land." To solve this problem,
new transaction systems were studied that would conceal the exact land price applied in
a transaction. To enable such transaction systems, several restrictions were relaxed, and
several new laws were enacted in 1986. Under circumstances like this, the public sector
was getting ready to form a partnership with private companies.
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Chapter III
A Case Study: The Omiya Sonic City
1. A Request for Replacing a Chamber-of-Commerce Building
The story of the Omiya Sonic City began in August 1976, when the Saitama
Prefectural Chamber of Commerce made a request for replacing its building. The
building was 7 stories high and located on the west side of Omiya Station, where the
Sonic City now stands. It was not a large building, with a land area of 3,112 m2 and a
floor area of 6,426 in2 . Since a 1,000-seat hall was housed in it, the floor area that was
actually open was very narrow.
The chamber of commerce made the request for the following reasons. First, its
operation range and volume had significantly increased, and it got to feel cramped for
room. For the last two decades, Japan had experienced remarkable growth. Saitama
Prefecture was no exception. Rather, it had grown at a higher rate than the country's
average. This created the chamber of commerce's need for more space. Second,
constructed in 1961, the building got so old that it required considerable maintenance
costs every year. The roof was leaking. Old elevators and an HVAC system had to be
frequently fixed. Third, the building was not well equipped. It did not have necessary
facilities to be a good public building. It had neither a hall lobby nor parking lots, though
it had a public hall.
In July 1978, the prefectural government set up the Committee of the Industrial
Center, a special committee consisting of 13 prefectural officials, to handle this request.
At this moment, nobody expected to construct a large complex like the Sonic City in the
future. In October 1978, the committee made a plan to construct an industrial center.
The plan was to construct a 15-story building, intended not only to provide space for the
chamber of commerce but also to encourage local tertiary industry by creating new space
for it. However, cultural facilities such as a concert hall were not included in this plan
yet.
2. Becoming the Prefecture's Leading Project
The plan slightly changed the nature, when the prefectural government adopted the
Intermediate Range Plan in November 1979. This plan urged the need of prefectural
cores, both economically and socially. In those days, Saitama was known as a prefecture
of no identity. Some people even believed that it was a part of Tokyo.
Yawara Hata, Governor of Saitama Prefecture, wanted to create something
appealing to local residents, thus establishing local identity. Facing a governor election
in the following year, he simultaneously wanted to have something visible as a result of
his administration.
Hata was originally a prominent lawyer, vice-chairing a local bar association.
Before becoming Governor, he served as an assembly member for two terms and as a
Dietman for four terms. When first elected as Governor in 1972, he attracted public
attention. This was because he was the only socialist governor at that time, belonging to
Japan Social Democratic Party. In 1979, however, he left the party and declared to serve
for local residents at large, in order to get broader support.
The Intermediate Range Plan proposed an industrial and cultural center, adding a
cultural function to the original plan. The objectives of the center were (1) to encourage
local tertiary industry, (2) to stimulate cultural spirits of local residents, (3) to promote
international exchange in the prefecture, and (4) to create a symbol of the prefecture.
The prefecture had many manufacturing factories but did not have enough office-
related businesses. The lack of these businesses had forced local residents to commute
to Tokyo, rather than work within the prefecture. The prefectural government thus
wanted to encourage local tertiary industry and increase office-related businesses for local
residents. Among such industry, business administrative functions, such as headquarters
and regional branches, were strongly needed, because these functions were expected to
help local residents stay within the prefecture and be attached to it.
Culture was considered equally important to establish local identity. A large all-
purpose hall was proposed as a cultural facility, because local residents, having no large
hall in the prefecture, had to go to Tokyo to see plays or attend concerts.
Creating a prefectural symbol was also a big objective of the new center. Since
many local residents were not indigenous but had moved from other prefectures to work
in the Tokyo metropolitan area, a visible symbol was necessary to unite such local
residents. A question then was what would make the center symbolic. Some considered
that a landscape full of plant-life would be appropriate because the city was famous for
its shrines and surrounding woods. Others suggested to construct something small but
luxurious, like a well-decorated opera house. Finally, it was agreed to construct a very
tall superstructure, which could be seen from distant places. From the economic point
of view as well, a highrise was considered most appropriate, for it would generate rental
revenues. A highrise seemed to be very symbolic because there was no highrise in the
north of Tokyo at that time.
Although the plan was adopted, no single matter was determined in detail.
Nobody knew where the center would stand. Nobody had a more precise idea of
functions that the center would assume than what the plan had declared. Since a public
hall seemed not to be profitable, some were somewhat doubtful that the center would
include cultural facilities even though the plan proposed to do so.
Various aspects of the center were discussed by 1980. The discussion was,
however, within two prefectural departments, the Commerce and Industry Department and
the Planning and Finance Department. These two departments were concerned because
the Commerce and Industry Department first received the request from the chamber of
commerce, and because the Planning and Finance Department had the authority to make
a final decision on financial matters. The prefectural government did not consider to
utilize private companies' funds and expertise at this moment, because private business
seemed brisk after the oil shocks in the 1970's. Rather, it intended to construct the center
at its own cost and capability. Unfortunately, however, budget for the center was not
easily appropriated, for the prefectural budget was tightly constrained. The center was
like a dream for the two departments.
In March 1981, the Committee of the Industrial and Cultural Center was
established. Some members were invited from outside of the prefectural government to
incorporate broader opinions that officials would not be struck with. The members
included a local university professor, an economic analyst, and an Omiya municipal
official, in addition to some prefectural officials. The committee proposed a 34-story
building, reflecting the idea of making the center a prefectural symbol. It also suggested
that the site of the center should be part of the land readjustment project area that the
Omiya city government had been conducting. This suggestion was reasonable because
the chamber of commerce was originally there. Also, the site was conveniently located,
being close to Omiya Station. Further, it seemed to be easier to assemble the site because
most of the site was publicly owned.
Having received the proposal from the committee, Hata established several inter-
departmental committees, thus making the Industrial and Cultural Center project a matter
of the entire government. The Inter-departmental Committee of the Industrial and
Cultural Center was first established in June 1981. Establishment of special purpose
committees was one of Hata's unique administrative measures. He often set up special
purpose committees and let them study a particular matter that the prefectural government
had to deal with. This measure was frequently used throughout this project.
The Inter-departmental Committee of the Industrial and Cultural Center basically
assumed the following three functions: to circulate information to the entire government,
collect opinions from the entire government, and make formal agreements that would
concern the entire government. The inter-departmental committee made such formal
agreements as follows: a highrise should be constructed to create a prefectural symbol;
the site should be in the west gate area where the chamber of commerce originally
existed; and the Planning and Finance Department would be responsible for land-related
affairs while the Commerce and Industry Department would be responsible for building-
related affairs. By the agreement of the inter-departmental committee, construction of a
highrise was formally determined; it was no longer a suggestion or dream.
In December 1981, Hata expanded the Committee of the Industrial and Cultural
Center to include more members from both the inside and outside of the government.
Several professors and officials were nominated. After adding new members, the
committee made an important suggestion to the prefectural government. It suggested that
the prefectural government should invite private companies to the project in order to use
their funds and expertise. Since the prefectural government did not have enough funds
and experience, the suggestion was very appealing. This having become a turning point,
the prefectural government began to consider how to use a Minkatsu method in promoting
the project.
In November 1981, the prefectural government conducted a questionnaire survey
to obtain local residents' opinions about the project. Of the valid responses, about 40%
expressed the desire to have a first class hotel and a convention center, because the
prefecture had neither of them at that time. Many of local hotels were small and looked
like what are called love hotels, where people stay for a special purpose. Local residents
therefore wanted to have a hotel that they could recommend their friends to stay. Also,
about 60% expressed that they usually visited Tokyo to enjoy cultural performances such
as concerts and theatrical performances. They could not find such opportunity in the
prefecture, because there was no large hall that suited such performances. This survey
made the prefectural government realize the need for a first class hotel, and became one
of the reasons why a hotel would be included in the Industrial and Cultural Center.
In October 1981, the prefectural government ordered Urban Planning and Design
Institute, one of Japan's experienced urban planning research institutes, to make a
comprehensive report of the center. With this report, the prefectural government wanted
to make sure of basic conditions that the center would have to satisfy. The report was
expected to be in very fine detail, including plans on the kind of facilities included, floor
areas of such facilities, and how to promote the project. Submitting a report in February
1982, the institute recommended that the prefectural government should establish a third
sector organization cooperatively with the city government and the chamber of commerce
to promote this project.
This report showed the first idea of how to employ a Minkatsu method in the
project. It was 1982, when the Second Ad Hoc Administrative Review Commission
published the report on administrative reform. The idea of Minkatsu was very popular
at that time. And, a third sector organization was a method that was the most frequently
employed in conducting Minkatsu projects in those days. Confronted with a tight budget
constraint, the prefectural government was interested in utilizing private companies' funds.
It was also interested in utilizing private companies' expertise, because it did not have any
experience in private office management. Soon, it began to examine whether the third
sector organization was applicable to the Industrial and Cultural Center project.
3. Considering Ways to Invite Private Companies to the Project
In February 1982, Hata officially decided to invite private companies to the project
somehow or another. Although interested in employing a Minkatsu method, Hata was
simultaneously anxious about establishing a third sector organization to promote this
project. He personally did not think that a third sector organization was a good way to
invite private companies or utilize their expertise. If a third sector organization was
established, the prefectural government had to get deeply involved in business it would
conduct. The prefectural government, however, had never inducted private companies
into its buildings. It had never managed buildings that private companies used. It was
also afraid of being charged with serious responsibility in case of failure of the project.
The Planning and Finance Department was also against the third sector method.
It did not think that the prefectural government could run a hotel by itself, although Urban
Planning and Design Institute recommended to do so in its report. It felt that running a
hotel was much riskier than managing private office space. Further, the capital necessary
to establish a third sector organization was expected to be so large that it did not think
enough funds would be contributed even if the prefectural government asked the city
government and the chamber of commerce to cooperate for the project. Actually, at least
4 billion yen (US$ 20 million) had to be raised at the beginning, assuming one tenth of
total project costs would be necessary to promote it. The chamber of commerce was,
however, unable to collect such a large amount from affiliates because many of them
were small and petty.
In February 1982, the same month that Urban Planning and Design Institute
submitted its report, Hata ordered the Commerce and Industry Department to study how
the project should be promoted. This was the first step in developing what is now called
the "Saitama Method." Having received the order, the department began to study both
pros and cons of Minkatsu methods that prevailed in those days. The study continued
until May 1983, when the prefectural government announced a unique method to promote
the project in the Construction Plan of the Industrial and Cultural Center.
In April 1982, Hata established the Industrial Policy Office within the Commerce
and Industry Department. The first duty of the office was to complete the Industrial and
Cultural Center. The office therefore studied various Minkatsu methods to select an
appropriate method for the project. The study was concentrated in the following three
methods: the third sector method, the land trust method, and the equivalent exchange
method. The third sector method was the most popular at that time. The land trust
method was attracting attention but was not established as a Minkatsu method yet. The
equivalent exchange method was totally new to Minkatsu projects.
As the study progressed, the office reached a conclusion that the equivalent
exchange method would be most appropriate for the project. Although totally new to
Minkatsu projects, this method was popular in the private development business. Under
this method, a developer usually constructed a building at its own cost. Then, the land
owner exchanged part of the land for part of the building, thus both parties owning and
managing the same building on the same land. Since both parties would exchange
equivalents between one another--i.e., part of the land from the land owner and part of
the building from the developer--this was called the equivalent exchange method. One
remarkable benefit of this method was that the land owner could acquire part of the
building without spending any amount of money nor the confusion over complicated
construction and management-related problems.
There were several reasons why the Industrial Policy Office reached this
conclusion. First, the prefectural government could save much construction costs.
Unfortunately, it had to pay a certain amount to obtain the necessary floor area, because
such area was expected to be more valuable than the land to be sold. Still, it could save
a significant amount by employing this method. Second, the prefectural government
would not be bothered by the private portion in the project. This meant that it would be
free from tenant recruitment and management. At that time, tenant recruitment seemed
to be difficult. The 60-story Ikebukuro Sunshine Building, Japan's then highest building,
was suffering a great loss, with only one third of the total floor area occupied. The
prefectural government was also afraid that it would face the pressure for rents lower than
the market rate. This seemed to be very probable if a public organization became in
charge of tenant recruitment and management. Third, the prefectural government would
be free from hotel business as well. Fourth, even if private office and hotel failed to run
successfully, the prefectural government would not have to take responsibility for it. The
responsibility of each sector was expected to be very clear under the equivalent exchange
method. This was because the building would be clearly separated into the public portion
and private portion. Also, since this method had many precedents in the private business,
this method seemed to be very feasible in a Minkatsu project.
The equivalent exchange method was, however, no cure-all. Rather, it contained
several problems to be solved. One problem was how to secure the fairness in
designating the private developer. The prefectural government usually called for bids
when it had to designate a developer. The government, however, could not do so this
time, because there was no execution drawing of the center yet. More exactly, the
government could not design the center alone because more than half would be owned
by the private sector. Without execution drawings, no developer could accurately
estimate costs to make a bid.
In solving this problem, the prefectural government hit upon a good idea, a
competition. There had been many competitions before. Those were, however, only to
select a design or plan. Once the competition was over, there was no official relationship
between the public and private sectors any longer.
The competition considered this time was different from them. It was a project
competition. It would require private developers to submit plans for each development
stage, such as design, finance, construction, and management. Since proposals would be
compared in a competition, fairness would be secured. Also, private companies' expertise
could be highly appreciated because they would design the center, both physically and
financially. If a project competition was held in this way, it was expected that a long-
term relationship would be formed between the prefectural government and a private
developer. This was because both had to use the same site and building together for a
long time.
Having devised a new method of a project competition, the prefectural government
could make clear the way to construct the Industrial and Cultural Center. First, the
prefectural government had established the clear objectives of the center. Now, it would
invite a private developer to construct the center according to the already established
objectives. Finally, the prefectural government would own and manage the center with
the developer, clearly separating each party's responsibility. This proposed way, however,
seemed to be somewhat risky to Hata. Since private companies would run business in
a building that the prefectural government planned for the public purpose, he had to
convince the public. He also had to get clear results to prove that his decision was right.
In May 1982, the prefectural government publicized the basic idea of the center.
This created some claims and controversies. At a public hearing held in June 1982,
residents requested the prefectural government to make careful considerations for
construction-related problems such as electric wave jamming. They also wanted many
local companies to be employed in the construction work. This was because there was
criticism that the prefectural government had placed higher value on nation-wide
companies than locally based small companies. Although knowing that no local
construction company could manage such a large project, they were still expecting to
receive some contracts from it. Their intention was very natural because the project was
conducted by the local government to promote local industry.
Both the prefectural and city hotel associations were expressing an objection to
the center. This was because the announced plan included a first class hotel. Many local
hotels were small, having less than 30 rooms. They were therefore afraid that they would
lose the market once a large well-furnished hotel was constructed.
In June 1982, Hata instructed the Industrial Policy Office to begin contact with
private companies. This was to obtain their professional views on the project. He urged
the office to do so, because he knew that the prefectural government was not capable of
making a project including large office space and a hotel materialize by itself. The office
space included was really large, compared to the existing local market. The project was
to construct about 30,000 m2 of private office space in a city where already 30,000 m2
office space was existing.
Having received the instruction, the office began contact with private companies.
Various companies were interviewed, including real estate companies, steel companies,
and general contractors. Although general contractors expressed positive opinions, other
companies were generally negative about the project. Real estate companies were
especially negative, reflecting a dull business condition after the oil shocks. The economy
was still dull in Japan at that time. The effective economic growth rate was 3.5% in
1982, 2% lower than that in 1979.
Table 3-1: The Effective Economic Growth Rates of Japan
Source: The Agency of Economic Planning
In September 1982, the prefectural government adopted the "You and I Plan," a
plan to establish 5 core cities in the prefecture. The plan was named after the first letters
of each core city, namely Yono, Omiya, Urawa, Ageo, and Ina. The plan was intended
to create self-sufficient cities in which people could work, shop, and play without going
out of the city. The Industrial and Cultural Center became a leading project of the plan,
because it would provide a place to work, rest, and enjoy for local residents.
In October 1982, the prefectural government began to officially contact the city
government concerning the site. Before this, the city government vaguely knew of the
project but did not exactly know what the prefectural government intended for the site.
The city government basically agreed with the plan. This was partially because the city
government was busy conducting the land readjustment Phase I project, which was to
improve the area just west of the station. The city government also considered that the
ultimate purpose of the land readjustment project could be achieved even by the
prefectural plan, because the readjustment project was to reduce the gap between the east
and west sides of the station. The center was expected to draw people to the west gate
area, thus reducing the gap between the two sides. In accepting the prefectural
government's plan, the city government set several conditions: a large all-purpose hall
and bike-parking space should be constructed in the site, and a pedestrian deck should be
constructed to connect the center and the station.
In March 1983, Hata decided that the project should be completed by 1988. The
schedule was very tight. Although many matters were left undetermined, the project had
to be done in five years. The due date was determined to be 1988 because a governor
election was planned that year. Although the election of 1980 resulted in an easy victory,
Hata expected that the coming election would be hard. He therefore wanted to be well
prepared not only for the next election but also for one after the next.
4. Shaping the Idea of Project Competition
The project became more and more concrete after the prefectural government
adopted the Construction Plan of the Industrial and Cultural Center in May 1983. This
plan described the basic conditions that the center would assume. In this plan, private
office space was officially determined to be for business administration, space which the
prefecture was significantly lacking in. The hotel was required to be first class, because
the prefecture did not have such hotels at all. Public office space was to be dedicated to
services for local residents that would be conducted face to face. About 28.4 billion yen
(US$ 142 million) was estimated as necessary to construct the center with facilities as
specified in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: The Construction Plan of the Industrial and Cultural Center
Use Floor Area
Office Tower 72,500 m2  Public Office: 19,500 m2
Private Office: 20,000 m2
Hotel: 20,000 m2
Retail: 5,000 m2
Others: 8,000 m2
Hall Building 11,500 m2
Parking Space 17,500 m2 500 spaces
Total 101,500 m2
The prefectural government considered that fairness would be the most important
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issue to lead a project competition to success. If bids could be accepted, it was easier for
the prefectural government to maintain fairness because a bid could be an unbiased
criterion in the selection. In the case of a project competition, however, the selection of
the best proposal could be subjective. This was because many aspects, including non-
numerical factors, had to be compared. To solve this problem, the prefectural government
established three principles in conducting a competition; (1) to establish an authoritative
competition jury that consisted of Japan's leading authorities, (2) to make a selection
process as open as possible, and (3) to set up clear criteria in advance to evaluate
proposals.
The prefectural government asked Eika Takayama, Professor Emeritus of Tokyo
University, to chair the competition jury. Takayama was one of the leading authorities
on architecture and urban planning in Japan. He was famous for having designed the
Komazawa Olympic Park for the Tokyo Olympic Games. If Takayama chaired the jury,
it would be a great step for the prefectural government to satisfy one of the three
principles, because it would establish a jury of great authority.
Takayama accepted the offer, contingent on the following condition: he would
select all jury members and secretariat staff of the project competition. He might have
a clear view of how the jury would work. What he wanted was to have a few capable
persons as jury members to make the jury effective.
In August 1983, the competition jury was established, with Takayama as the chair.
The members were Mitsuhide Sawada, Chair of Japan Architectural Center, Shigeru Itoh,
Professor of Tokyo University, and Akio Sekine, Deputy Governor of Saitama Prefecture.
Japan Research Institute for Social Development, one of Japan's most experienced urban
planning research institutes, was nominated as the secretariat.
The jury had to solve many difficult problems. This was because public
organizations in Japan had never purchased a completed building nor managed a building
with a private company. They had always placed a construction order to have a building.
They had also managed buildings alone without any private company. Further, they had
never held a project competition. Competitions previously held were architectural
competitions, which decided only architectural design. A project competition, however,
would be required to consider a whole process of the project, including design,
construction, and management. The prefectural government, therefore, had to take many
aspects into consideration in forming a competition.
The jury first clarified issues to be considered, and determined that it would make
sure of the basic conditions that the prefectural government had to satisfy for the
competition, make the competition terms, and select the best of the proposals submitted.
The jury had over 40 meetings in the following 7 months. The prefectural
government established three inter-departmental committees to assist the jury to set up the
competition scheme.
The jury carefully conducted feasibility studies. This was one of the important
services, the jury decided, for the project. The jury was especially interested in the
financial feasibility, for many private companies had expressed negative opinions on the
project. The jury carefully examined the feasibility by changing various financial factors,
such as construction cost, rent, vacancy rate, and rentable floor rate, in order to obtain a
reliable pro forma. Through this work, it became confident that certain industries would
be interested in promoting this project, even if real estate companies would not be
interested. Takayama was thinking that the Industrial and Cultural Center would be
feasible only if two kinds of companies were involved in the project. He thought that real
estate companies were not needed in this project, because the government would prepare
the site. What would be needed were general contractors and financial institutions.
After conducting studies on various aspects including site boundary, traffic
circulation, and financial feasibility, the jury established the competition terms. It
prescribed various requirements that every proposal had to satisfy. For example, it
required that the office tower must be over 30-stories to make it visible from distant
points. A hotel was recommended to be in the office tower, although this was not
compulsory. A hall building must include one large hall and one small hall. The large
hall must have at least 2,500 seats, and the small hall must have at least 500 seats.
Construction costs of the hall building must not exceed 6 billion yen (US$ 30 million).
Although the basic idea had not changed from the Construction Plan of the Industrial and
Cultural Center of 1983, some minor changes were made. For example, public office
space and parking space became slightly smaller than those in the construction plan of
1983.
In the competition terms, the prefectural government promised to private
developers that it would prepare the site by the time construction work would begin.
Simultaneously, however, the prefectural government asked developers to do several
things for the project. For example, it wanted developers to solve all neighborhood-
related problems, such as sunshine reduction, wind damage, and electric wave jamming.
It also wanted them to construct a pedestrian deck at their own cost for the city.
Table 3-3: Basic Conditions Prescribed in the Competition Terms
Use Site Area Floor Area
Office Tower 7,584 m2 Public Portion:
Office: about 12,000 m2 (net)
Private Portion:
Office: over 20,000 m2 (gross)
Hotel: over 20,000 m2 (gross)
Retail: about 5,000 m2 (gross)
Hall Building 6,000 m2
Park 6,746 m2
Bus Depot 2,000 m2
Parking Space 260 spaces
Total 22,330 m2
Since the project would require experiences in various fields, the competition
terms prepared a pre-qualification procedure. Both the jury and prefectural government
did not believe that they could confirm developer's capability without such procedures.
They also thought that no single private company could complete this kind of project
alone, and therefore asked developers to form a group of private companies before
applying for the competition. Each group was required to include:
(1) a company that had managed over 100,000 m2 rental space, and
(2) a company that had constructed an over 30-story building.
No competition had prescribed such a requirement in Japan before.
The jury made a suggestion to the prefectural government concerning the form of
land title to be transferred. The jury made such a suggestion because it realized this
matter important as it boiled down contents of the competition terms. The prefectural
government had not determined whether it would sell or lease the land to a developer yet.
If it sold the land, the prefectural government would save much construction costs, which
was an attractive prospect because the prefectural budget was not so wealthy. The jury,
however, advised to lease the land for the following reasons. First, by keeping the
ownership, the land and building uses would be secured even in the future. Second, by
keeping the ownership, the prefectural government might be able to enjoy land
appreciation. Omiya was growing. Several large developments were under evaluation,
besides this project. The land was therefore expected to appreciate significantly in the
future. On the other hand, if it sold the land, such a transaction might accelerate the land
appreciation of the surrounding area. As a matter of fact, the national government had
significantly increased the land price by selling its land at high prices, and raised
criticisms. Takayama was afraid of triggering extraordinary land appreciation, and
therefore advised the prefectural government to lease the land. He further advised to set
the reference range of the land price. By doing so, he saw that both the public purpose
and private incentives would be well balanced.
The prefectural government was very anxious about whether private companies
would make any proposals. Actually, many private developers were still negative about
the project. It was very risky for private developers to construct a highrise and a first
class hotel in Omiya, in which the population was only about 360,000. The economic
condition was also very unfavorable at that time. Furthermore, it was disclosed that
another first class hotel was under evaluation in the city. Two first class hotels seemed
too much for Omiya. Worse, the hotel was to be built next to the Industrial and Cultural
Center. A serious oversupply was expected, and local hotel associations were planning
to raise a strong objection against these hotels.
Having heard negative business opinions, the prefectural government slightly
changed the competition terms. It allowed private developers to choose a form of land
title from several options, as they could run business. The titles allowed were ownership
and two kinds of lease titles. An ownership was important for real estate companies
because they usually borrowed money on the security of the ownership to the land.
Before announcing the competition terms, the jury made the contents as clear as
possible. It made the following issues especially clear: what the prefectural government
wanted to have in the project, what would be compared in the competition, and what
kinds of companies had to be in a group to apply for the competition.
In February 1984, Hata ordered prefectural officials to designate the developer in
a hurry. He had a governor election that July.
5. Executing the Project Competition
In March 1984, the competition terms were officially announced. The
announcement created a wide repercussion, because the prefectural government allowed
private companies to design the project as they liked, as long as the requirements were
satisfied. No competition in Japan had ever allowed developers for such a broad liberty.
No competition in Japan had ever asked developers for such broad plans ranging from
design to management. Confronted with unexperienced tasks, however, private developers
had to figure out how to deal with the requirements. Proposals were due coming August,
only five months later.
After the announcement, 63 companies visited the prefectural government to obtain
the competition terms. Among them, 26 were general contractors, 6 were real estate
companies, 5 were banks, and 3 were insurance companies. When the prefectural
government held an explanation meeting for the competition terms, however, only 41
companies attended it, 22 less than those who came for the competition terms. Among
them, 18 were general contractors, 5 were real estate companies, 2 were banks, and 2
were insurance companies. While general contractors were still interested in the project,
other industries seemed to be losing interest.
In May 1984, applications for pre-qualification were accepted. Only three groups
submitted the application. These groups included the NLI/Fujita group, the Dai-ichi Life
Insurance Company group, and the Nomura Real Estate Company group. Two of the
three were headed by an insurance company, and the other was headed by a real estate
company. Being pre-qualified did not require of companies anything. They did not have
to make any proposal, if they did not want to do so. They were also allowed to reduce
private office space to 16,000 m2 , although the prefectural government strongly desired
to have over 20,000 m2 of private office space. Most companies, however, did not want
to be even pre-qualified for the project, deciding that Omiya did not have the potential
to find enough tenants to fill the large office space required. Only three groups did
express their intent to make a proposal for the center.
Each group assigned each company's role in a similar way. The first role was to
finance the project and own the center with the prefectural government. Insurance
companies and a real estate company were expected to assume this role. The next role
was to construct the center. General contractors were assumed to take this role. The last
role was to architecturally design the center. Since various uses had to be beautifully put
in a limited space, a design firm was included in each group.
All of the three groups had enough experiences and were pre-qualified for the
project. All of companies included were based in Japan. NLI/Fujita group consisted of
Nippon Life Insurance Company, Japan's largest insurance company, Fujita Corporation,
a middle class general contractor, and Nikken Sekkei Corporation, a top class design firm
in Japan. NLI was the largest insurance company not only in Japan but also in the world,
holding the total assets of 24,881 billion yen (US$ 157.477 billion). Footnote 1 Fujita was
the only middle class general contractor that expressed the intent to make a proposal.
Dai-ichi Life group consisted of Japan's second largest insurance company, 4 of
Japan's top class general contractors, and a top class design firm. There were 5 very
large general contractors in Japan, and 4 of them were included in this group, namely
Kajima, Shimizu, Taisei, and Takenaka.
Nomura group included a real estate company, a general contractor, and a design
firm. Nomura Real Estate Company was s subsidiary of Nomura Security Company, the
largest security company in Japan, and seemed to have a strong financial capability. The
general contractor included was Obayashi, the other of the 5 largest general contractors
in Japan. These three groups had to make a proposal in three months. They also had to
find a hotel company that would operate a first class hotel in the center.
In July 1984, a governor election was held. The last two elections were easy for
Hata, since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had long led Japan's politics with
the absolute majority in the Diet, did not put its own candidate. Hata was already one
I The total asset was as of March 30, 1990. The exchange rate used is 158.00 yen = US$
1.00, the rate prevailing on the same day.
of well experienced governors in Japan, having served for 12 years. He also served as
a director of the national governor council one year before.
This time, nevertheless, Hata was expected to have hard time. He was 73 years
old, not young anymore. Further, the LDP was planning to challenge him, selecting a
former deputy governor as its own candidate. Dominating the local assembly by 55 over
94, the LDP really wanted to take back the governor's seat at any cost. Having served
as a deputy governor, the LDP's candidate knew much about the prefectural
administration, and strongly disputed Hata's long administration. The election resulted
in Hata's victory again, with 1,011,198 votes for Hata and 644,587 for the LDP's.
Compared to the last two elections, however, the LDP made a great progress for the
governor's seat.
In August 1984, three proposals were submitted for the center. Each proposal was
well considered, even though the schedule was very tight. There had been only five
months from the announcement of the competition terms to the submission of proposals.
They made all of the plans, the drawings, and the miniature model required in these five
months.
NLI/Fujita proposed to construct a hotel beside an office tower (Figure 3-1), even
though the competition terms strongly recommended to have both hotel and office spaces
in the same building. As a result, its office tower became low although the prefectural
government wanted a high structure.
Dai-ichi Life proposed a high office tower with a hotel on the top (Figure 3-2).
With a hotel atrium on the top, the office tower was expected to look like a lighthouse
at night. This proposal was very attractive because the center was planned to create a
prefectural symbol. A beautiful office tower with a captivating light source on the top
could be very appealing and suitable for a prefectural symbol.
Nomura proposed to put glass curtain walls on an office tower. Glass could make
a striking building without creating much oppressing feeling to neighbors. It might,
however, bother neighbors with light reflections. The office space was the smallest of
the three, reflecting its pessimistic view for tenant recruitment. Nomura seemed
pessimistic for it proposed only 18,756 m2 of private office space, while the other two
proposed about 30,000 in 2 , 1.6 times larger. This difference created an approximately
15,000 m2 difference in total office space.
Table 3-5: Comparison of the Proposals
NLI/Fujita Dai-ichi Life Nomura
Maximum Height 137.1 m (31F) 150.0 m (34F) 143.2 m (38F)
Floor Area (m2 ) 104,539 105,556 91,180
Office Tower 89,263 90,456 76,174
Hall 15,276 15,100 15,006
Total Costs (million yen) 35,839 31,433 26,920
Office Tower 26,075 22,660 18,948
Hall 5,980 5,969 5,961
Others 3,784 2,804 2,011
Land Lease Title Fee: (1) 4,756 4,597 4,109
Public Portion Selling Price: (2) 12,049 12,371 12,513
Amount That the Prefecture Would
Have to Pay to the Developer 7,293 7,774 8,404
(million yen): (2)-(1)
Source: The Prefecture of Saitama
Since the prefectural government suggested that the land price would range from
1,034,000 to 1,095,000 yen/m2 , the unit price of the land lease title was very similar
among the three proposals. However, the total amount of the land lease title fee was
slightly different among them, because the land area to be leased was different.
NLI/Fujita proposed the highest fee, intending to obtain 82% of the floor area in the
office tower. Nomura proposed the lowest because it planned to use only 71% of the
floor area, selling the rest to the prefectural government.
Total construction costs significantly varied among them. NLI/Fujita's proposal
was about 9 billion yen (US$ 45 million) higher than Nomura's. This was because both
total floor area and unit construction cost were higher in NLI/Fujita's proposal than in
Nomura's. While proposing the highest total construction costs, NLI/Fujita offered the
lowest amount for the prefectural government to be paid. This was because the public
portion to be sold to the prefectural government was the smallest of the three.
Proposal of NLI/Fujita Group
Main Developer:
General Contractor:
Architect:
Nippon Life Insurance Company
Fujita Corporation
Nikken Sekkei Corporation
Figure 3-1:
Figure 3-2: Proposal of Dai-ichi Life Group
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Main Developer:
Main Developer:
General Contractors:
Architect:
Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company
Shimizu Corporation
Kajima Corporation
Takenaka Engineering Corporation
Taisei Corporation
Nihon Sekkei Corporation
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Figure 3-3: Proposal of Nomura Group
Main Developer:
General Contractor:
Architect:
Nomura Real Estate Company
Obayashi Corporation
Shin-ichi Okada and Associates
In August 1984, about the same time when each group submitted a proposal, the
competition jury expanded to be able to judge issues in various fields. The jury examined
each proposal from the following four aspects: site plan, building design, management
plan, and public burden. It also evaluated how symbolic the center would be from the
architectural point of view and how feasibly the center could be constructed according to
the schedule. The jury had to recommend only one proposal out of the three by
November 1984, 3 months later.
Table 3-4: The Jury Members as of August 1984
Name Title
Chair Eika Takayama Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University
Mitsuhide Sawada Chair, Japan Architectural Center
Ken-ichi Azuma Vice President, New Center for Urban Development
Yoshiya Uchida Professor, Tokyo University
Shigeru Itoh Professor, Tokyo University
Akio Sekine Deputy Governor, Saitama Prefecture
Akio Ohyama Deputy Mayor, Omiya City
Before the jury selected a proposal to be recommended, several problems took
place. One was Fujita's discount offer after the submission of a proposal. In the
NLI/Fujita group, Fujita was in charge of the buildings to be sold to the prefectural
government. After the submission of a proposal, Fujita made an offer to lower the sales
price. The competition terms had not explicitly said no discounting was allowed. Rather,
the prefectural government expected that sales price would be reduced to some extent by
each company's business effort. The jury, however, knew that it had to prudently handle
this offer, because the acceptance of the offer might cause suspicion with regard to the
fairness in the judgement process.
Another problem was the submission of an improved proposal after the deadline.
After the submission of proposals, the jury held several hearings to further understand
each proposal. One group resubmitted an improved proposal, for it found a major
disadvantage while responding to questions at the hearings. An improved plan was not
necessarily problematic because it could more properly reflect what the prefectural
government intended by the center. The jury, however, decided to carefully deal with this
too, in order to maintain the dignity of the judgement.
After careful consideration, the jury decided to handle these matters as if they did
not take place. More exactly, if NLI/Fujita was selected, it decided to use the amount
discounted in order to improve the site and surrounding area, rather than just to reduce
public burden. This was decided not to raise any suspicion on the selection process
concerning the discount offer. It also decided to consider the improved plan as a possible
alternative to the original proposal. These decisions were equivalent to say that the jury
established the fundamental principle of comparison. It decided to compare the original
proposals submitted by the original date in order to maintain the fairness in the
competition.
To make a proposal, each group spent about 20 - 30 million yen (US$ 100,000 -
150,000) even without personnel expenses. Total costs were estimated to be several times
larger. One of the reasons why such large costs were incurred was that the competition
terms required to submit many 1/200 scale plans. Since the prefectural government was
to purchase a part of buildings, it had to make sure that asking prices made by developers
were reasonable, even before deciding on the developer. However, 1/200 plans imposed
a heavy burden to private developers. They had to spend extraordinary time, personnel,
and money on the plans. Further, once they lost the competition, they had to lose
everything devoted to a proposal.
6. Designation of the Developer
In November 1984, NLI/Fujita's proposal was selected as the best and
recommended to the prefectural government. The prefectural government, in turn,
designated NLI/Fujita as the developer candidate contingent on certain conditions.
NLI/Fujita was designated not as the developer but as the candidate because its proposal
still needed some amendments to better suit the public objectives.
Established in 1889, NLI was Japan's premier and largest life insurance company.
It had invested in real estate, considering it to be one of good asset management tools.
Real estate was an important asset component for NLI, because it provided a stable
income source, acted as an inflation hedge, and was less exposed to price fluctuation risk.
In view of these benefits, NLI had increased real properties dramatically. In 1975, it
owned 111 rental buildings. This number increased by 143% to 270 by 1984. The recent
increase was especially remarkable, with over 20 buildings completed every year. The
following two factors also helped NLI increase real properties. First, NLI's premium
incomes had significantly grown, thus increasing its total assets. The total assets grew
from 2,931 billion yen in 1975 to 10,731 billion yen in 1984, 3.7 times larger in a decade.
To manage increased assets, it invested more in real properties. Second, NLI intended
to strengthen the financial position by accumulating assets that would rapidly appreciate.
Land in Japan had almost always appreciated, and therefore was considered to be a good
tool to accumulate unrealized profits.
Although its main business was life insurance, NLI was also an experienced real
estate developer. It had conducted various kinds of development, including office, hotel,
shopping mall, theater, and residential developments. It held about 200 real estate staff,
including registered architects and tenant recruiters. It also had a building management
subsidiary to manage a large number of buildings it rented. By using premium incomes
instead of borrowing money, it could conduct projects that other real estate companies
could not deal with for the profitability reason.
There was, however, a controversy at NLI about whether to make a proposal for
the Industrial and Cultural Center. NLI did not worry about the skill to construct the
center at all. It worried about whether it could collect enough tenants to maintain proper
returns on the project. Several conditions helped NLI to make a proposal. First, it could
find a well-known hotel company that was interested in opening a branch in Omiya. NL
had a broad sales network, which worked not only for insurance sales but also for NLI's
other transactions such as loan furnishing and security dealings. Through this network,
NLI knew that the Palace Hotel Company was interested in the project. Second, two new
super-express lines, opened some years before, brought a great growth opportunity to
Omiya. Both Tohoku Super-Express Line, opened in June 1982, and Joetsu Super-
Express Line, opened in November 1982, had Omiya as the starting station. This enabled
Omiya to establish itself as an entrance to the Tokyo metropolitan area. In general, cities
with super-express-line stations had prospered very rapidly. NLI therefore considered that
Omiya had the potential to be a large business core. At that time, however, many
companies were busy restructuring their businesses because of the yen's rapid
appreciation after the Plaza Agreement in September 1985.
Fujita was a middle class general contractor in Japan. However, it had deep roots
in Omiya, especially in the west gate area. Since its redevelopment plan was adopted for
the land readjustment Phase I area in May 1975, Fujita had fostered a good relationship
with the local community. For this reason, it knew vaguely about the project from the
late 1970's through its local network. Interested in the west gate area for a long time, it
had an idea of how to develop the site. In other words, Fujita was well prepared for the
project, having its own idea of the site and being familiar with local affairs. It considered
that the punctuality of the construction schedule was the foremost condition. It therefore
applied high technology to avoid objections from local residents, thus making the
construction schedule as certain as possible.
NLI/Fujita's proposal was considered the best for the following reasons: First,
NLI/Fujita paid much attention on how to harmonize the center with the surrounding area.
It was hard to build a highrise in a densely built residential area. The proposal, however,
handled this problem well by putting an office tower on the south edge of the site, thus
reducing the shaded area. The hall entrance faced toward retail shops across the north
edge, intended to pour a pedestrian flow to them after events. Also, careful consideration
was made for the physical shape of the center to make it as friendly as possible. A hall
building looked very like a grand piano. Curves were frequently employed to reduce
massive impression of the center. Second, NLI/Fujita well considered for neighborhood-
related problems. It reduced the height of the office tower, because it found a
broadcasting beam passing over the site. If the tower had been 10 meter higher, a serious
jamming problem would have occurred. Therefore, it separated the hotel from the office
tower. This decision was very important to make sure that the construction work would
finish according to the schedule. Third, NLI/Fujita proposed the lowest public burden.
Although the total construction cost was the highest of the three, the amount the
prefectural government had to pay was the lowest. The proposal NLI/Fujita made was
not attractive enough to create a prefectural symbol. It seemed to be, however, very
sound and feasible to the prefectural government.
To be designated as the official developer, NLI/Fujita had to amend the proposal
in the following ways: the top of the office tower should be broadened and dedicated to
the public; the number of hotel rooms should be reduced to get support from local hotels;
inside of the hall building should be slightly redesigned; and the appearance of the 14th
floor, which contained machine rooms, should be redesigned aesthetically. These
amendments cost NLI/Fujita as much as 1,774 million yen (US$ 8,870,000) in total.
Concluding a contract in May 1985, the prefectural government officially
designated NLI/Fujita as the developer. In the contract, the prefectural government
promised the developer to prepare the site at its own expense. In turn, the developer
promised to take care of all affairs that would be raised by local residents and finish the
construction work by December 1987. No delay was allowed. Also, Fujita agreed to
preferentially employ local companies for the construction work, and NLI agreed to well
consider for local companies when they expressed their wish to enter the office tower as
a tenant. NLI also agreed to help the prefectural government manage the public portion
of the center. They, however, postponed to make an agreement on how to manage
outdoor facilities such as the park, bus depot, and pedestrian deck in this contract.
7. Site Preparation and Other Preparatory Works
Site preparation was the prefectural government's responsibility. Although the site
was as large as 22,220 m2, it seemed not so difficult to assemble the site because only
four landowners owned it. Even better, most of them were public or semi-public
organizations. The prefectural government owned the chamber-of-commerce site. It
acquired the site from JNR through the municipal government to construct a building for
the chamber of commerce in the late 1950's. The municipal government owned a school
site, the largest in the project site. JNR, a semi-public railway company, owned shrine
and dormitory sites. JNR owned the shrine to pray for transportation safety and
dormitories for its employees. Also, one private company owned a site for a bank
building.
The land readjustment project had been executed in the area since 1982. Footnote 2
This project had been conducted by the city government to reduce the gap between the
east and west sides of the station. In January 1982, the Sakuragi Elementary School,
which had dominated the site, moved to a nearby area. Then, many bars moved from the
Phase I area to this site to clear the Phase I area for construction work. In October 1982,
the prefectural government inquired the city government if the site was available for the
center. Having obtained a positive response, the prefectural government concluded an
agreement with the city government in May 1983. By this agreement, the site was
officially determined to be used for the Industrial and Cultural Center, and the prefectural
government became responsible for the site preparation.
2 Although the land rearrangement project was originally decided in 1963, the execution
began in 1982.
After NLI/Fujita became the official developer, the project progressed from the
planning stage to the construction stage. First, the prefectural government removed the
stall-like temporary structures, which had been dedicated to bars, in order to prepare the
site. There were 81 such bars in the site. They were removed from the original place
for the land readjustment project. Forced to move once before, they were unwilling to
move again. They were not favorable to public organizations in general, because a public
organization made them move to this site. To them, public organizations seemed to
consider that they could remove them at their discretion. Prefectural officials had to visit
them almost every night to obtain their consents to move again.
In January 1985, the competition jury converted to the construction work
supervisory committee. At first, the jury was planned to be dissolved. However, some
kind of organization was needed to mediate controversies that were expected to occur
between the prefectural government and developer. The supervisory committee,
consisting of the same members as the jury, came to take this responsibility. Its
responsibility further included to supervise every issue on the project, including written
agreements, change orders, and establishment of a property management organization.
In June 1985, NLI/Fujita started execution drawings. One month before, it had
concluded an agreement with the prefectural government on major architectural changes,
and was required to finish the drawings by the end of that year in order to start
construction work at the beginning of the next year. When the execution drawings were
completed in November 1985, the exact price of the public portion was determined. Until
this time, the price was still approximate though 1/200 drawings had been prepared. The
price agreed was slightly higher than the appropriate price, with 12,371 million yen
agreed to 12,049 million yen estimated. This increase was caused mainly by an increase
in the public portion area in the office tower.
In July 1985, the shrine was removed to another location. The chamber-of-
commerce building was also demolished in September 1985, and all durable structures
were dismantled off the site. What left in the site were shabby bars installed in temporary
structures.
In October 1985, the prefectural government agreed with the municipal
government that it would purchase the necessary land in the site from the city. At first,
the prefectural government intended to have it for nothing. The city government,
however, did not think it reasonable and asked the prefectural government to purchase it
at a fair price.
The time schedule was very tight, and the prefectural government did not spare
any help to get the project done in time. One example was that it helped the developer
obtain necessary permits. This kind of practice was really unusual. The developer had
to get various building permits from the city government to construct a complex with
office, hall, and hotel uses. The process to get permits was very complicated with many
departments concerned. Not only it was complicated, but also it took much time, which
could have prevented completion of the project by the due date. The prefectural
government therefore called meetings, inviting both the city government and developer,
in order to make the permit process effective and smooth.
8. Construction-Related Works
In January 1986, the construction work began. Every temporary structure had
been removed by this time, for the last lease contracts had expired in December 1985.
The construction period was 27 months, which was surprisingly short. Further, the last
3 months had to be dedicated to interior finish work. The main structure of the center
had to be completed in 24 months, although it usually took over 30 months to construct
an over 30-story building. Moreover, the center contained several factors which might
have prolonged the construction work. The office tower required deep foundations to
reach competent soil 51 meters beneath. It also required deep excavation for the 4-story
substructure. Furthermore, large hall and hotel buildings had to be constructed
simultaneously. Extraordinary efforts had to be made to finish the construction work by
the due date.
In the same month, the prefectural government concluded a land lease agreement
with NLI, allowing NLI to use the land for 60 years. In this agreement, the prefectural
government showed generosity to the developer. It agreed that no rent had to be paid
during the construction period. It also agreed that the land lease title fee should
appreciate by 7% while Omiya's commercial district appreciated by about 20% on
average. Footnote 3
The construction schedule was so tight that a new construction method had to be
applied to complete the center as scheduled. This was the main reason why the up-down
construction method was applied to this project. Footnote 4 The up-down construction method
3 Since the competition terms required to propose the land lease title fee as of August 1984,
some adjustments had to be made to consider the 17 month difference from the competition to
the agreement.
4 Up-down construction initially involves the installation of the substructure's wall, column,
and foundation system, prior to excavation. Then, the substructure's floor slabs are used as the
construction cross-lot braces as well as the permanent braces, as they are installed according to
the excavation work. Except for extremely deep excavations in excess of seven levels, it usually
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allowed builders to execute substructure and superstructure simultaneously, thus reducing
the overall construction period. It was, however, risky to employ this method to this
project, because this method had never been applied to a highrise. There were serious
concerns regarding whether it was safe if an earthquake occurred during the construction
work; Japan was known as a country of earthquakes.
Nevertheless, Fujita had to employ the up-down construction method in order to
complete the project by the due date. The construction period was expected to become
6 months shorter with this method, though it was expected to be over 30 months with the
conventional method. The method had several more benefits besides the time saving
effect. It could reduce the number of dump-cars coming to the area everyday, because
it prolonged and averaged excavation activity. It could also reduce sound-related
problems because floor slabs could keep the noise from escaping. Further, it allowed for
a steady construction progress regardless of weather conditions, for a floor slab would
work as a roof.
There was another experiment Fujita made to reduce the neighborhood-related
problems. Fujita put ferrite tiles on the south wall of the office tower to reduce electric
wave jamming. This experiment was also risky because the material had never been used
for such a large area. If the tiles did not work as expected, Fujita had to lose about 1
billion yen (US$ 5 million) spent on them. Further, Fujita might have needed to pay
compensation to those who sustained a jamming problem. Fortunately, the tiles worked
takes longer to construct the substructure by the up-down construction method than by the
conventional method; however, the overall construction schedule can be shorter due to the earlier
start of the superstructure.
This method was employed at the Olympia Center project in Chicago in the early 1980's
and the Rowes Wharf project in Boston in the middle 1980's.
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very well. A survey conducted afterwards proved that the jammed area was 86% smaller
than expected. While it was expected to be about 2.9 km2 without ferrite tiles, the area
that actually sustained the problem was 0.4 km2.
During the construction, the schedule became much tighter. This was because the
city government made a construction order for the park and underground bike parking.
At first, the government intended to construct them later. However, it decided to
construct them together with the main buildings in order to create the united atmosphere
in the center. The due date was the same, March 1988. The construction work began in
November 1986, 11 months later than the main buildings.
As indicated several times, the project had to be supported by local residents to
get completed by the due date. Around the site, another two large developments were
progressing about the same time. The municipal government was constructing the 18-
story Omiya Jack Information Center on the north edge of the station. In the land
readjustment Phase I area, the landowners were cooperatively constructing the 13-story
Omiya Sky Building to create a retail center. Because of these three large developments,
the Industrial and Cultural Center included, construction-related problems were expected
to be very complex. Local residents therefore wanted to have one definite organization
that could deal with every matter related to these developments.
In January 1986, local residents established the Omiya Station West Gate Area Big
Project Council to deal with such problems. Although local residents took the initiative,
various organizations sent delegates to the council, including the prefectural government,
the city government, and general contractors. Since it was hard for local residents to
identify which project caused a specific problem, this council was beneficial to them very
much. What they had to do was just to speak to the council about any problems they
worried about.
Many problems were discussed in the council. Construction-related vehicles were
one of such problems. Although roads were not broad, about 100 dump-cars came to the
area everyday. Electric wave jamming was also considered serious. Interfered by the
three tall buildings, the jammed area was expected to be much complicated. Local
residents especially worried about this problem, because they had already experienced
jamming problems when the station expanded for the new super-express lines. The
council tried to take countermeasures before any specific problem took place. It laid TV
cables for about 3,500 households before the superstructures appeared in the sky. The
establishment of the council was beneficial not only to local residents but also to the
prefectural government and developer. The council helped local residents remain
supportive to the project, one of the important factors to complete the center in time.
In March 1986, the prefectural government concluded the final contract with
NLI/Fujita on how to transfer the buildings. Financing was an important issue for the
prefectural government, because the sales price was too high to pay at once. It wanted
to issue local bonds and therefore asked the Ministry of Home Affairs for it. Before
1985, the ministry did not think that the bond issuance was appropriate. This was
because it felt that a Minkatsu project should be done without financial assistance of the
national government. The issuance of local bonds was national government's assistance
because most of bonds issued by local governments would be bought by the national
government or its related funds at a low interest rate. The prefectural government kept
negotiating with the ministry because it was hard to pay such a large amount at once,
even though a certain amount could be saved by selling the land lease title. After a series
of negotiations, the ministry approved the bond issuance only for the hall building. This
was because the hall building would be owned and managed by the prefectural
government only. The hall building would be constructed as if it was constructed in the
conventional way, where the prefectural government gave a contract order and made
installment payments.
The consent from local hotel associations was another important issue. The
developer and the Palace Hotel Company went through meetings with the hotel
associations until the final agreement was made in December 1986. This was because
they had to obtain approval from the local hotel association in order to open a large hotel
by law. Since most local hotels were small and focused on the specific market, their
foremost concern was to maintain their hold over the market. They therefore wanted to
make sure of the following issues in the agreement: the hotel would remain the first class
status even in the future; the hotel would set appropriate rates for a first class hotel; the
hotel would not make any daytime discounts, and the hotel would reduce the number of
rooms from 215 to 209. The hotel associations also asked to have an information center
in the hotel to advertise their affiliates.
9. Building Management
The prefectural government had to seriously consider how to manage the center
because it had to manage floors of various uses, including public office space, the
common area of the office building, and halls, as well as outside facilities. When the
prefectural government held the competition, it had not decided how to manage the center
in detail.
In November 1985, the prefectural government conducted a survey to know how
to manage the center. For this reason, questions were made to know how local residents
wanted the prefectural government to manage the center. The result of the survey
indicated that the prefectural government should establish a third sector organization to
manage the halls rather than directly manage them. This was because event promotion
and budget making could be more flexible by doing so. If the prefectural government
directly managed the halls, it had to obtain assembly's approval every year, which might
reduce the consistency and flexibility of the hall management. Also, a third sector
organization could freely seek profits and ask for private companies' support.
In April 1986, the prefectural government established an inter-departmental
committee to further the study on the hall management. Knowing that hall management
would not be profitable, the committee wanted the third sector organization to be run on
a self-paying basis. To achieve this end, the committee decided that the third sector
organization manage both the public office space and halls. Although at least 500 million
yen (US$ 2.5 million) was expected necessary to manage the halls even without any
events, it was hoped that profitable office space would compensate for unprofitable halls.
In May 1987, the Saitama Foundation for Culture and Industry was established
with capital of 150 million yen (US$ 750,000). The prefectural government contributed
one third of it, and other 38 organizations, both public and private, contributed the rest.
Organizations contributing included the city government, local prominent companies, and
nation-wide companies. Among them, 12 were financial institutions. Hata was installed
as the first president of the foundation.
In October 1987, the prefectural government established another third sector
organization. The city government and NLI also joined the establishment because this
organization was to manage the common area of the office tower. The capital was
contributed according to the floor area each party owned. That is, the capital of 20
million yen (US$ 100,000) was contributed 79% by NLI, 20% by the prefectural
government, and 1% by the city government. Since NLI contributed the most capital, it
sent the most personnel, including the president.
The prefectural government considered that the center should have a nickname to
become friendly. The name "Industrial and Cultural Center" seemed too stiff to be loved
by everybody. The prefectural government therefore asked local residents to make a
nickname for the center and received 3,797 responses. Among them, the Omiya Sonic
City was considered the best and selected as the nickname of the center in September
1986.
The construction work supervisory committee played an important role even after
the designation process. It had settled many conflicts among the parties concerned. The
management of the pedestrian deck was a good example. Although it was decided that
NLI would construct the pedestrian deck at its own cost, how to manage it was
undecided. Even after completion, a considerable cost was expected to maintain the
pedestrian deck, for it had to be cleaned periodically and fixed when dilapidated. Since
the city government wanted the pedestrian deck, the city government was expected to own
it. However, it did not want to do so because of the high maintenance cost. Then, the
matter was turned over to the supervisory committee. The supervisory committee
mediated this matter as follows: the deck outside of the site should be owned and
maintained by the city government alone; and the deck within the site should be shared
and maintained cooperatively by both sectors according to the floor area ratio. The
supervisory committee played a role even in selecting a stage curtain designer. Both the
prefectural government and developer considered the supervisory committee to be
important, because they could be better convinced when a third party with a profound
vision mediated a problem.
10. Tenant Recruitment
Tenant recruitment seemed to be very hard, for many companies were restructuring
their businesses at that time. NLI would be happy if it could fulfil 60% of the private
office space in the first year. It intended to increase the occupied floor area by 10%
annually to make the entire floor occupied by the fifth year. The economic condition
was, however, harder than expected. When NLI sent a questionnaire to gauge private
companies' views on the project, only 10 - 20 companies out of 1,800 positively
responded. Although NLI had managed about 250 rental buildings and 3,000 tenants, it
predicted hard times awaiting for it in finding enough tenants for the Sonic City.
After the middle 1980's, Japan's economic condition began to show a different
trend. Triggered by the relaxation of monetary control, Footnote 5 the economic condition
turned upwards. The growth rate of the real Gross National Product rose from 2.9%
(1986) through 4.9% (1987) to 5.9% (1988). About the same time, the superstructure of
the Sonic City came to appear. The superstructure became taller and taller in a short
5 The official discount rate was lowered to 2.5% in February 1987, the lowest rate after the
World War II.
time, for the up-down construction method was employed. A favorable wind began to
blow for the Sonic City: the economic condition was getting better, and the appealing
superstructure came to appear in the sky.
Against the pessimistic prediction, all floor areas became occupied even six
months before the opening. This was surprising because NLI had expected that 60%
would be occupied at most for the first year. The fact was much better. The floor areas
were completely occupied well before the opening; all tenants were reliable companies.
In April 1988, the Omiya Sonic City opened. 107 private companies moved into
the Sonic City as tenants. Among them, 19 were service providing companies, 18 were
retail companies, 16 were real estate or construction-related companies, and 7 were
financial companies. 37% of tenants were locally based. Besides these private
companies, 23 public organizations entered the Sonic City, thus creating about 3,500 jobs
in total in the center.
The top of the office tower was dedicated to the public as suggested by the jury.
A large showroom was installed there, where anyone could enjoy a free panoramic view.
If the weather permitted, Mt. Fuji, the highest mountain in Japan, could be seen from
there. A great effort was made by Hata to open the showroom. He inquired Gaishi
Hiraiwa, the president of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), whether TEPCO was
interested in opening a showroom in the Sonic City. Having experienced great success
in opening a showroom at another place, TEPCO decided to open a showroom, although
it might not generate any profits.
There seemed to be several reasons why all office space could be occupied even
from the first year. First, the economic condition turned upwards after the mid 1980's.
Especially when the Sonic City opened, the real estate market was about to heat up. The
strong wind was blowing in favor of the Sonic City. Second, the super-express lines that
opened in 1982 considerably changed Omiya. They helped Omiya accumulate office-
related businesses and become a business core. Third, the office tower was well
equipped. It was equipped with many intelligent facilities. For example, it provided the
digital PBX shared service to reduce tenants' communication costs. Tenants could save
costs because they could make free phone calls inside the center by this service. Fourth,
rental rates in Omiya were low compared to those in Tokyo. Even though the Sonic City
required higher rates than the average in the area, they were still inexpensive compared
to those in Tokyo.
Chapter IV
Impacts of the Omiya Sonic City
1. Impacts of Urban Development
Urban development creates various impacts on various fields. If a development
is attractive to people, it invites crowds to the site and the surrounding areas, and make
them enlivened. It may increase tax revenues, if it enhances the sales volume in the area
or invites new companies to the area. Then, enhanced sales and invited companies may
increase employment in the area.
Urban development has negative impacts, too. It may cause traffic congestion,
which is serious to a poor road system as typically seen in Japan. It may also cause a
security problem, because it induces unfamiliar people coming to the area even at night.
Further, it may raise neighborhood land value, thus raising the level of neighbors'
property taxes. Neighbors may need to bear a heavier tax burden, even though they
themselves do not want the area change at all.
In this chapter, I would like to examine impacts of the Sonic City from the
following four aspects: how local residents use the Sonic City; how much economic
impact the Sonic City has brought to the prefecture; how the west gate area has changed;
and what political impact the Sonic City has created.
2. How the Sonic City is Utilized
One way to measure the success of mixed-use development is to count how
frequently people use developed facilities. In the case of a shopping mall, a development
can be considered successful in a sense when it draws many people and makes them stay
long at the site.
The Sonic City has drawn over 6 million people every year since the opening. In
1992, it drew 6.29 million people, the largest number after the opening. This figure was
significant for a bed-town of about 360,000 residents. Further, most of the floor areas
were used not as retail but as office space. Office space can generally draw less people
than retail space, and therefore over 6 million people a year can be considered very
successful for a development of this kind. The total number of people who visited the
Sonic City has reached 31 million in five years.' This number indicates that about 17,000
people have visited the Sonic City each day. It is also equivalent to say that every
prefectural resident, 6.6 million, has visited the site about once a year.
Table 4-1 shows that those who come to the office tower have increased, while
those who come to the halls and showroom have decreased. Still, it is surprising that the
showroom whose floor area is only 3,000 m2 invites over 50,000 people every year.
Without any competing highrise around, this showroom has offered a spectacular view
and a comfortable place for leisure to the public. Reflecting the internationalization of
the prefecture, the increasing number of people visit a passport center every year, which
is included in the category "others."
Table 4-1: The Number of Visitors to the Sonic City
(Unit: Millions of People)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total
All-Purpose Halls 0.88 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.76 3.81
..................................... ........... ................ .. . ....... ........................
Office Tower 3.91 4.25 4.33 4.41 4.42 21.32
Showroom 0.96 0.71 0.62 0.57 0.55 3.41
................................................ ............... ..... . ...... ........................
Others 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.60 0.56 2.66
Total 6.20 6.22 6.21 6.28 6.29 31.20
Source: The Prefecture of Saitama
How frequently the halls and meeting rooms have been used is another important
aspect to consider impacts of the Sonic City on the prefecture. This is because the more
frequently such facilities are used, the better financial performance the third sector
organization that manages the facilities can achieve. Required to bear considerable
maintenance costs, this organization has ingeniously devised a way to make the public
facilities frequently used. The organization did not insist on the kind of performances that
were put on the stage, but has allowed a wide range of performances. It has also
welcomed citizen groups to use the halls. The utilization rates of the halls, both main and
auxiliary, have risen up since the opening, and reached over 90% by 1992.2 Because of
this flexibility, the halls are frequently used as well as has become friendly to local
residents. Further, the halls are equipped with fine stage devices, and many users have
repeatedly used them for this reason.
Table 4-2: Utilization Rates of the Public Facilities
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Main Hall 87% 88% 84% 88 % 92%
Auxiliary Hall 81 % 86% 93 % 92% 94%
Convention Halls (6 halls) 53 % 60 % 70 % 72 % 66 %
International Conference Room 64 % 51 % 68 % 76 % 72 %
Meeting Rooms (27 rooms) 60 % 82 % 86 % 88 % 86 %
Source: The Prefecture of Saitama
The public office space has shown a good performance, too. It has been 100%
occupied since the opening. The rental rates are about 70% of the market average, which
is about 6,800 yen/i 2 in 1993.3 This rental revenue has enabled the managing
organization to compensate for a loss from the hall management and run on a self-paying
basis. The prefectural government thus has not needed to subsidize the organization at
all,4 one of the unexpected achievements it has made.
The private office space has also been 100% occupied. Even in 1993, when Japan
was in a serious depression after the burst of the overheated domestic economy, the office
space was still 100% occupied. The rental rates were about 10% higher than the market
average, although about 55,000 m2 office spaces were vacant in the area at that time.'
According to a survey conducted by the prefectural government, 61% of tenants
that had moved into the Sonic City expressed that they had moved in because the location
of the Sonic City was convenient. Also, 23% of tenants expressed that they moved in,
expecting to create a positive corporation image by being in the Sonic City. Tenants in
the Sonic City were generally satisfied with their being in the Sonic City. Over 90% of
tenants considered that the Sonic City had contributed the prefecture promoting local
industry, creating the opportunity for cultural activities, and establishing the identity of
the city and prefecture being as a symbol.6 This was identical to say that the prefectural
government had successfully achieved the original objectives of the project.
3. Economic Impacts
The Sonic City has made significant economic impacts too. It is hard to
accurately estimate economic impacts that one particular development has made.
However, it seems to be true that the Sonic City has made significant impacts on the
prefecture, because the new term, "Sonic Effects," was invented to refer to impacts that
were made by the project. Since Saigin Research Institute, a subsidiary of the largest
bank in the prefecture, estimated the economic impacts, I would like to introduce them
to glance at what impacts the Sonic City has created on the prefecture.
Saigin Research Institute applied Wassily W. Leontiefs input-output analysis in
estimating the level of economic impacts the Sonic City made. This analysis assumes that
there is a certain relationship in the good-and-service flows between industries and the
final demand of an economy.' On this assumption, the analysis allows to estimate the
level of economic impacts by working out a tabular summary of the flows, which is
unique to each economy.
According to the estimation, the Sonic City induced 155,733 million yen (US$
1,237 million), Footnote 1 3.25 times larger than its original construction costs. While it was
under construction, 47,867 million yen (US$ 380 million) was invested in the Sonic City,
including construction material costs and tenant improvements and excluding land
acquisition costs. After the first round of the flows, 69,306 million yen (US$ 551
million) was induced through the purchase of construction materials and the consumption
of wages. Then, after the second round, another 38,560 million yen (US$ 306 million)
was induced. The total ripple effects estimated were 107,866 million yen (US$ 857
million). Out of this amount, 33,214 billion yen (US$ 264 million) was used to increase
personal income.' This was equivalent of employing additional 5,000 persons in the
prefecture.
It may be dangerous to believe the estimated figures as they are. This is because
estimation is estimation. This is also because some of these ripple effects may be
generated by reducing products that may have been generated in nearby prefectures
The exchange rate used is 125.85 yen = US$ 1.00, the rate prevailing at the end of 1988.
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otherwise. Therefore, it is safe to say that the pure effect of the Sonic City on the whole
society is less than this estimation.
Table 4-3: Ripple Effects of the Sonic City
(Unit: Million Yen)
Total Construction Costs 47,867 (US$ 380)
Ripple Effect 107,866 (US$ 857)
1st Round 69,306 (US$ 551)
2nd Round 38,560 (US$ 306)
Total Effect 155,733 (US$ 1,237)
Source: Saigin Research Institute
The estimation of Saigin Research Institute also said that economic impacts of the
Sonic City would continue after completion as well. Through business activities that
would be conducted in the Sonic City, the gross prefectural product was estimated to rise
by 0.5% (65 billion yen) in 1988 and by 0.7% (107 billion yen) in 1992.9 Again,
however, some products might be generated through the reduction of products in other
prefectures. Thus, we need to be careful when interpreting this kind of estimation.
Table 4-4: Estimation of Gross Prefectural Product Increased by the Sonic City
(Unit: Billion Yen)
Source: Saigin Research Institute
The estimation continuously said that this increased prefectural product would then
11I1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Increased GPP 64.7 6573..2 84.2 107.1
% of GPP Raised 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.6% 0.7%
bring additional tax revenues to the government at each level. According to it, the
prefectural government would obtain additional 3,364 million yen through an increase in
tax revenues in 1988 and 6,274 million yen in 1992.1 Since this is just an estimation and
an old estimation done in 1989, it is hard to know if the prefectural government has really
gained extra tax revenues as was estimated.
However, if the estimation was not misdirecting, then the prefectural government
may have possibly gained extra 10,326 million yen tax revenues in the first three years
(Table 4-5). This amount is larger than what the prefectural government paid to acquire
the public portion of the Sonic City (7,516 million yen). In other words, the prefectural
government could well pay off the Sonic City in three years. Since it does not subsidize
for the management of the public facilities, the prefectural government does not have to
pay for the Sonic City anymore. Therefore, it may be possible to say that the prefectural
government built the Sonic City for nothing and will enjoy the fruits from it without
spending extra costs from now on.
Table 4-5: Estimation of the Prefectural Tax Revenue Induced by the Sonic City
(Unit: Million Yen)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Induced Tax Revenue 3,364 3,099 3,863 4,711 6,274
Source: Saigin Research Institute
4. Social Impacts
The Sonic City, with the 31-story office tower, shoots up in front of the locally
important station. The appearance is so appealing that the Sonic City has made
significant impacts on local residents' everyday life, too.
Before completion, the west gate area was sort of an isolated area. Most of those
who visited this area were JNR employees and other labor workers. The city was
growing to the east of the station, creating a great gap between the two sides of the
station.
The Sonic City, however, has changed the basic pattern of pedestrian flows. The
tall office tower has pulled in thousands of businessmen to the Sonic City every morning.
The large multi-purpose hall, which seats over 2,500 people, has been attractive to those
who want to see something unusual, because they can now see some event if they come
to the Sonic City anytime. With the over 90% utilization rate, many people could expect
that some event may be presented in the hall.
The change in pedestrian flows was remarkable. According to the survey
conducted by the municipal government in October 1989, it became obvious that more
people visit the west of the station rather than the east." This is to say that the Sonic
City has changed the structure of the city within one year and a half after completion.
Another survey clarified that about 80% of those who were using the station
considered that the west gate area became much better than before. Additional 16%
considered that the area became somewhat better, thus making over 95% feel positively
about the change that had occurred in the west gate area. 56% of people expressed that
they visited the west gate area more frequently than before. Interestingly, elders answered
more positively about the change although such people usually show distaste for a
significant change. Over 90% of those who were in their 50's - 60's responded positive
to the change in the area."
Not all changes were attributable to the Sonic City. With two more large
developments ongoing in the area, the change should be said a joint result of these three
developments. Being the largest, however, it may be possible to say that the Sonic City
has played the most important role in enabling the change that had occurred in the area.
For example, the same survey clarified that 88% of respondents felt more like going to
the west gate area than before for shopping, entertainment, and dinner. The Sonic City
seems to be important in offering such opportunities in the area. Also, 37% expressed
their wish to work in the Sonic City in the survey."
5. Political Impacts
A governor election was held in June 1988, 2 months after the opening ceremony
of the Sonic City. Since the LDP made every effort to take the governor's seat back,
Hata had a close call this time. He himself felt that this election was the hardest that he
had ever experienced."
Hata defeated the LDP's candidate again by 1,250,987 to 927,491 and began to
serve his fifth term as the governor. No one can accurately tell how the Sonic City
affected the election. Many voters, however, voted based on their evaluation of the past
administration and expectation for the prefectural future. According to a survey
conducted by a newspaper company, 20% of voters decided their votes based on how a
candidate could improve the prefecture for tomorrow, although the most disputed point
was whether or not to introduce a value added tax at the national administration level. 5
Again, accurate impacts are undeterminable. However, it may be possible to say
that Hata was reelected because his administration was highly evaluated by local
residents. And the Sonic City has worked to make his administrative achievements
visible to prefectural residents.
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Chapter V
Conclusion
1. Lessons from the Sonic City
The Sonic City has given us many lessons to be reminded. In this chapter, I
would like to discuss such lessons with a special emphasis on roles that the prefectural
government assumed in the project and factors that helped the two sectors form a good
partnership. First, distinctive features of the Sonic City project will be reexamined. Next,
roles that the public sector assumed in the project will be discussed. Then, factors that
enabled the two sectors to form a good partnership will be examined. Finally, some
suggestions will be made to improve the Japanese public-private partnership in the future,
based on lessons that we need to learn from the Sonic City project.
2. Distinctive Features of the Sonic City Project
The Sonic City has been distinctive in each stage of the project, including
planning, construction, and management. These features began to be formed when the
prefectural government asked private companies for assistance to get the project done.
Struggling with unexperienced problems, the prefectural government considered to invite
private funds and expertise to the project, and invented a new method now called as the
"Saitama Method."
The Saitama Method generally refers to the following two features: clear
separation of each sector's responsibilities, and use of a project competition as a way to
designate a developer. Originally, the prefectural government intended to proceed with
the project at its own cost and capability. However, it decided not to do so because the
project seemed to be risky for a public organization that had never run business in the
same market where private companies did their business. Since the project included
private office and hotel functions, if the prefectural government did the project alone, it
had to run these businesses by itself. Then, the prefectural government began to consider
a way to induce private companies to the project. It was natural for the prefectural
government to think that way because the idea of Minkatsu was prevailing in Japan at that
time.
The Sonic City's features began to be formulated when Hata, the governor of
Saitama prefecture, denied the third sector method as a way to invite private companies'
funds and expertise in 1982. This was one of the critical decisions in the project, because
this decision persuaded the prefectural government to devise a new method to cooperate
with private companies. At that time, it was generally considered that a third sector
organization would not work well, sometimes concealing each party's responsibilities.
In a third sector organization, most responsibilities seemed to be commingled and shared
by the two sectors together. Since responsibilities were not clearly assigned to each
sector, the public sector might have to take every blame in case of failure of a project.
This recognition was the very first step for Hata to look for other ways to cooperate with
private companies. And, because of this recognition, the prefectural government invented
a new way to invite private companies to the project of the public purpose.
The prefectural government dared to separate each party's responsibilities. This
separation worked well because each party could concentrate on what it was most
interested in. The prefectural government established a base plan in which it would
construct public office space to promote local tertiary industry, all-purpose halls to offer
prefectural residents high-level culture at affordable rates, and an international conference
room and a passport center to stimulate international exchange in the prefecture. The city
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government helped the project by constructing roads and a public park, because
constructing those facilities suited to the original intent. It originally intended to improve
the living environment of the west gate area, which was considered under-equipped.
Also, NLI could have a large investment opportunity by constructing private office space
and a hotel.
The separation of responsibilities, however, did not mean that there was no
collaboration between the two sectors. Rather, they repeated negotiations about what both
sectors had to handle together. For example, they had to decide the way to manage the
space that both sectors would use in common. They also had to decide the way to create
the united atmosphere in the site, for example, by using the same base color for the entire
project. In this way, I may be possible to say that the Japanese public-private partnership
has evolved from the stage of shared responsibilities, which was frequently observed in
third sector organizations, to that of clearly separated responsibilities. And, a project
competition was an attempt that one daring prefectural government made to move into
such a new stage.
The employment of a project competition was also important in that the project
competition offered each party the opportunity to express its objectives and constraints.
A project competition was originally employed to maintain fairness in designating a
private developer. However, it worked better than originally expected and made each
party clarify what it really wanted. In setting the competition terms, the prefectural
government had to consider what it really needed in the project, why it needed them, and
what offers it had to make to invite private companies. Private developers also had to
make sure what contributions they could make and what conditions they needed the
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prefectural government to accept in making a proposal. For instance, Nomura proposed
smaller office space than the competition terms required. This was identical to Nomura
saying that the prefectural government had overestimated the market and it could not
accept such a condition. In forming a partnership, it is very important to show one's own
views and objectives in the first place. The project competition seems to have worked
as the first meeting to start negotiations, each party clearly expressing its standpoint.
The project competition was also endowed with an element that would require the
private sector to cooperate with the public sector for a long time. The competition terms
asked private developers for management plans as well as design and construction plans.
This meant that they were asked to propose how they wanted to manage properties with
the public sector. This also meant that the prefectural government was expecting to have
a long-term relationship with a private developer. In making a proposal, private
companies were required to assume such a long-term relationship with the prefectural
government.
Besides that, the prefectural government probably had its own reason to form a
long-term relationship with a private developer. The prefectural government prepared the
site to construct the Sonic City. This deed could be justified because the Sonic City was
planned by the prefectural government to promote public interests. Simultaneously,
however, it was possible to say that the prefectural government would prepare the site for
a private developer constructing a private building for its own profits. Different from the
US, Japan did not have a system in which a public organization assembled a site to write
down to a private developer in order to promote public interests. Such a maneuver might
be understood as unreasonable asset distribution from a public organization to a private
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developer in Japan, even when selling price was about the market price. In order to avoid
such criticism, the prefectural government needed to retain some level of control over the
project even after completion. And, for this reason the prefectural government probably
did not separate the project to two parts but formed a partnership with a private
developer.
The competition jury was also important in this project. Although the jury was
established mainly to keep the dignity in selecting a private developer, it also acted to
help the two sectors maintain a good relationship. To me, the jury seems to have worked
as a mediator, doing more than originally expected to do. It was originally established
to make a judgement of proposals. However, it helped the prefectural government
seriously recognize that the site preparation was government's responsibility. It conducted
preliminary studies and decided how much area should be assembled and by whom. It
also clarified conditions necessary to induce private companies to the project. Even after
a developer was designated, the jury contributed to the project as the construction work
supervisory committee. And, because of its high dignity to some extent, the two sectors
could keep negotiating over issues that would impose extra financial burden to either
sector. For instance, the committee settled a conflict on how to manage the pedestrian
deck. The public sector wanted the private sector to manage it because the private sector
constructed it. The private sector, on the contrary, wanted the public sector to manage
it because the private sector constructed it for public interests. Then, the committee
settled this conflict by suggesting that both sectors manage it together, bearing costs
according to the floor area that each sector would own. Because this committee was a
third party with significant authority, it could effectively handle conflicts between the two
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sectors. And, if such a committee had not existed, the project might have been prolonged
with many conflicting issues unresolved.
Planned to include both public and private facilities in the same site, it is possible
to say that the Sonic City was endowed with a seed that would grow to a collaboration
between the two sectors. And, the prefectural government performed a very important
role in successfully raising such a seed to flower. In the next section, I would like to
examine what roles the prefectural government assumed and how such roles worked in
forming a partnership with a private developer.
3. Roles the Prefectural Government Assumed in the Sonic City Project
In the Sonic City project, the prefectural government performed roles that public
organizations in Japan had rarely played before. It contributed the land to a joint project
with a private developer. Such a deed had rarely been conducted because governmental
organizations had been unable to own the land in common with private entities by law.
This was also because such a deed would easily raise public criticism in Japan as
explained before. The prefectural government, however, overcame such difficulties to
attain its objectives. To understand government roles, it is important to know what
achievements the public sector wanted to make in this project. Therefore, I would like
to first clarify objectives that the prefectural government held in this project and then
examine roles it assumed.
In the Sonic City project, the prefectural government intended to change Saitama
Prefecture to something more than Tokyo's bed-town, and this seems to have been the
foremost objective. Although both Saitama Prefecture and Omiya City had rapidly grown,
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this was because the area had functioned as a bed-town. Many prefectural residents had
commuted to Tokyo instead of going to local companies or schools. The prefecture had
grown in terms of population, but many of them were those who had moved in to
commute to Tokyo and were not deeply attached to the area. The prefecture, therefore,
wanted to establish itself as an area to be loved by residents. Although the project was
originally planned to replace an old building, the prefectural government wanted to make
the most of this opportunity to find a way to establish identity. This was why the
prefectural government stuck to creating a prefectural symbol throughout the project.
To establish itself, the prefectural government wanted to make a prefectural core
that could assume the following functions: to promote local tertiary industry, offer
sophisticated cultural performances, and facilitate international exchange in the prefecture.
The prefectural government intended to encourage not manufacturing business but office-
related business because its original idea was to draw back people who commuted to
Tokyo. A large all-purpose hall was also important to make those who frequently visited
Tokyo for a sense of culture look again in their home prefecture. Before the Sonic City,
there had been no such a large well-equipped hall in the prefecture.
Probably, the prefectural government also intended to increase local employment
and tax revenues by this project. The office tower was expected to house about 120
tenants. This meant that about 3,500 people would work in the Sonic City. While some
of them might be replaced from somewhere in the prefecture, others were to be newly
employed. The construction work of over 30 billion yen (US$ 200 million), was also a
good opportunity to increase employment because local construction companies could
expand their business by receiving construction orders. Moreover, new large office space
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was a good revenue source for the prefectural government. Generally, office space was
one of the main tax sources of prefectural governments in Japan. The amount of such tax
was determined by both the total office floor area and the number of employees working
there. For this reason, a large office development must have been very attractive to the
prefectural government.
There may have been a political reason for the Sonic City project. Having a term
end in 1988, Hata, the governor of Saitama Prefecture, may have wanted to make a
visible achievement in his administration. And as such an achievement, he may have
been interested in the Sonic City project. It is not clear when he began to consider the
Sonic City as an opportunity to make a political achievement. However, it is reasonable
to assume that he intended to make a positive factor by this project in order to prepare
for the coming election, which he expected to be hard.
As compared to the US cases, it is interesting that the site itself was less important
for the prefectural government in the Sonic City project. In the US cases, public
organizations seem to be interested in the site, and such an interest is often a starting
point to form a partnership with private developers. The Horton Plaza, San Diego, and
the Copley Place, Boston, were developed to improve space that had been unfavorable
for people's everyday life. The Pike Place Market, Seattle, and the Faneuil Hall
Marketplace, Boston, were developed to preserve space that had been in a critical
situation even though it had historical value. In forming a partnership, both sectors were
interested in a certain site, and to improve or preserve such a site, they formed a
partnership. In other words, the two sectors in the US were under a situation like this:
Two adversaries were in the same boat, and they found that boat leaking. Discovering
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both have a common interest in saving the boat, they formed a partnership to determine
a common course of action: Should they row for shore, or try to plug the leak?
In the Sonic City project, on the other hand, the prefectural government decided
the site probably for the following reasons: it was the original site of the chamber-of-
commerce building, and it seemed to be easy to assemble the site because most of it were
publicly or semi-publicly owned. In the project, the prefectural government did not
intend to improve an unfavorable area or preserve something valuable to the prefecture.
The prefectural government was not in a leaky boat and therefore not forced to form a
partnership. Forming a partnership with a private developer was just one option for the
prefectural government in this case. This understanding may lead us to the following
conclusion: In the US, a public-private partnership is formed to develop a site that has
a reason to be developed, and forming such a partnership is therefore inevitable to some
extent. In Japan, on the other hand, a public-private partnership is formed to construct
facilities that the area is lacking in, and forming a partnership is more like an option for
the public sector.
It is dangerous to make a conclusion from only one case. However, even in many
other cases, the Japanese public-private partnership is not used as a way to preserve
regionally valuable properties or improve deteriorated areas. And, since a site itself does
not have a special meaning in a project, citizen groups do not usually play an important
role in a public-private joint project in Japan. In the Sonic City project, for example,
local residents could not assume a role in making or shaping the project plan. What they
could do was only to take part in the construction process to reduce construction-related
problems. The chamber of commerce, which was supposed to represent local small
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business interests, did not play any role in the project, although its request was the first
step of the project. No local organization, except for governments, got involved in the
project on behalf of local communities for local interests.
Having analyzed objectives of the prefectural government, I would like to examine
roles that it played in the project. One important role that the prefectural government
played was to make base plans such as the Intermediate Range Plan and the Construction
Plan of the Industrial and Cultural Center. Most of the plans were rather conceptual
showing just facilities to be constructed. However, because of these plans, each party
could make a right decision towards the foremost objectives, even when dissonances
occurred during the project.
Another government role was to prepare the site. This was done with the city
government. The city government helped the site preparation because it had conducted
the land readjustment project in the area. The main role of the prefectural government
was to replace stall-like bars that had moved from the adjacent land readjustment area.
Though governments generally do not take such a role, the prefectural government did
it to persuade the city government to contribute the site that had been under the city's
own project to the Sonic City project.
The site preparation was a significant support to the private developer in that this
reduced burdensome work of the developer. This also brought a good development
opportunity that an ordinary developer could hardly obtain alone. Unfortunately, it is not
clear how much the public sector had spent to assemble and prepare the site in total.
However, it is possible to estimate the worth of the entire site by multiplying the total
land area by the unit land price employed in the land lease title transaction between the
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prefectural government and NLI. According to this estimate, the entire site was expected
to be worth of 26,168 million yen (US$ 164 million) Foot 1 at the time of the transaction.
Although this figure does not include costs incurred to prepare the site such as for grading
and improvements or compensations paid to replace the land owners and other property
owners, it is obvious that the public sector contributed a very expensive asset to the
project. According to the figure publicly available, the public sector spent 7,713 million
yen, Footnote 2 and the private sector spent 29,675 million yen on the project. This means
that the public sector assumed only 21% of total costs in the project. However, when the
land value is taken into consideration as shown in the Table 5-1, the public burden
becomes 33,881 million yen, 4.4 times larger than the amount the public sector actually
paid in cash. This also suggests that the public sector practically assumed more financial
role than did the private sector, bearing 53% of total assets contributed to the project.
Footnote 3
Table 5-1: Financial Contribution of the Two Sectors
(Unit: Million Yen)
Public Sector Private Sector Total
Land 21,077 (81%) 5,091 (19%) 26,168
Building 12,371 (34%) 23,889 (66%) 36,260
Other Improvements 433 (38%) 695 (62%) 1,128
Total 33,881 (53%) 29,675 (47%) 63,556
The exchange rate used is 159.10 yen = US$ 1.00, the rate prevailing at the end of 1986.
2 7,713 million yen = (12,371 + 433 - 5,091) million yen, where 12,371 million yen is the
cost of the building that the public sector acquired in the project, 433 million yen is the cost of
improvements such as a park and bus depot, and 5,091 million yen is the amount that the public
sector earned through the land lease title fee.
3 The park and other public-use sites are included as well as the building site to calculate
the contribution ratio of 53%.
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Probably, it is possible to say that inventing a new way to form a partnership was
an unique role that the prefectural government performed in this project. The prefectural
government devised a project competition in order to select a private partner to do the
project with. It also set up the competition jury, a third party organization, to maintain
fairness in the process of designating a developer. Probably, it is common in the world
that the public sector is less flexible in altering its organization and administrative
procedure than is the private sector. This is especially true in Japan, and therefore it was
very crucial that the prefectural government invented a new way to cooperate. Moreover,
the prefectural government had conducted preliminary feasible studies before making the
competition terms. It conducted the studies because it knew how important it was to
make a plan attractive to private developers. And, it tried to make a scheme in which
private developers could fully demonstrate their expertise. Actually, the prefectural
government imposed the minimum level of constraints on private developers in the
competition terms and left the greater part flexible to encourage free and interesting
ideas.' It may have been a result of such consideration that the prefectural government
prepared the site and coordinated the building permits process between the city
government and the private developer. As a matter of fact, no public organization had
prepared a site for private developers or coordinated the building permit process in Japan,
because they did not think such deeds to be their roles and because such deeds were easy
to raise public criticism.
Another notable role that the prefectural government assumed was to manage
public space in cooperation with the private developer. For a long time, governments had
been prevented from owning and managing a property with a private organization by law
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in Japan. The Sonic City was an early case after such laws were relaxed. The prefectural
government established a third sector organization with the private developer to manage
the common space of the office tower and part of the pedestrian deck. Through this third
sector organization, the prefectural government not only kept but also deepened the
relationship with the private developer.
Of roles that the public sector assumed in the Sonic City project, some seem to
be common to the US counterparts. First, it took responsibility for advance planning and
feasibility studies. According to a survey conducted by Frieden, et al,2 it is very common
that the public sector takes such responsibility in the US. The public sector took such
responsibility in 40 out of 40 total projects investigated. Second, it prepared the site and
constructed public facilities such as roads and a park. This is also very common in the
US, as the same survey reports that the public sector acquired land in 34 out of 40
projects and constructed infrastructure in 36 projects. Third, it established special-purpose
organizations for the project such as the Industrial Policy Office, inter-departmental
committees, and the competition jury. Establishing such special organizations is
sometimes observed in the US, too. Also, by flexibly altering the administrative
organization, the prefectural government could show earnestness to the project. Last, it
requested the private developer to change several architectural features in order to make
the Sonic City better suit the public purpose. For example, it asked to make the top of
the office tower open to the public with the expansion of the floor area. Similarly in the
US, the Pasadena Redevelopment Authority required the private developer to make some
stores face the street against the conventional layout pattern of a shopping mall in the
Plaza Pasadena project, Pasadena, California. The authority also asked to make a public
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passageway through the mall structure to link the Public Library and City Hall with the
Civic Auditorium in the same project.
On the contrary, some government roles were original to the Sonic City or the
Japanese public-private partnership. First, it leased the land rather than sold it to the
private developer. In the US, the public sector leases land to help private developers
reduce its front-end investment as well as to retain control over the land. In the Sonic
City, however, the public sector leased the land not to support the private developer but
to enjoy land appreciation, which was very probable in Japan. Also, it did not write
down in selling the land lease title. Second, it used its own funds to do the project
without inducing national government support. The prefectural government issued local
bonds, but such bonds had to be repaid in the long-run. Therefore, there had been no free
funds transferred from the national government. Many US local governments, however,
worked as a conduit to circulate federal funds especially when the urban development
action grant was available. Third, it showed a significant risk aversion throughout the
project while US cities headed into sharing development risk and profit with private
developers.
Similar to the prefectural government, other parties also had their own objectives
and roles in participating in the Sonic City project. The Table 5-2 summaries such
objectives and roles as shown below.
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Table 5-2: Each Party's Objectives and Roles in the Sonic City Project
Objectives
- establish a prefectural identity
(symbol) to shape itself free from
Tokyo.
- create a prefectural core with
facilities to promote local industry,
culture, and international exchange.
- offer a place to work, eat, and enjoy
to local residents.
- create construction works for local
companies.
- may have expected to increase tax
revenues.
- establish a visible achievement of
Hata's administration.
Roles
- make clear public objectives of the
Sonic City.
- replace stall-like bars to prepare the
site.
- conduct preliminary feasibility
studies before inviting private
proposals.
- coordinate the building permit
process.
- manage the common space with the
private developer.
- manage public office space and all-
purpose halls.
(- hold a project competition with the
establishment of the competition
jury, a third party organization to
judge proposals, to maintain fairness
in the competition process.)
City Government - reduce the environmental gap - assemble the site.
between the east and west sides of - construct public facilities such as
the station. roads and a park.
- expand the station for the new - manage roads, park, and part of the
super-express lines. pedestrian deck.
- construct a better road system.
- construct a pedestrian deck system
to enable safe pedestrian circulation.
- demolish shabby bars to improve
living environment.
NLI - make an investment in a stable - finance the project.
income-generating asset. - construct a pedestrian deck for the
- establish a business record of city.
conducting a project with the public - solve any problems that local
sector to expand the business residents would raise.
chance. - find a hotel company that would
- establish a positive company image manage the hotel in the Sonic City.
by contributing to a prefecturally - manage private office space.
important project.
- establish a more stable business
foundation for its main business,
insurance policy sales.
Fujita - receive a construction order of the - make architectural plans.
project. - construct the Sonic City by the due
- establish a sounding business date.
foundation in Omiya. - solve any problems that local
residents would raise.
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Prefectural Gov't
4. Factors that Facilitated a Partnership between the Two Sectors
It may be important to examine the reasons why the Sonic City project resulted
in a success. But, it is more important to clarify the reasons why the two sectors could
form a good partnership in the project. I classified such reasons into three categories:
those particular to the public sector, those particular to the private sector, and those
common to both.
Among reasons that were particular to the public sector, Hata's strong leadership
should be firstly remarked. As the governor, Hata demonstrated the strong leadership in
various scenes. The original plan of the Sonic City was just to replace an old building
for the chamber of commerce. But, he shaped this idea to the plan of the Industrial and
Cultural Center, what is now known as the Sonic City. Under his leadership, the
prefectural government released the Saitama Long Range Plan in 1978, the Intermediate
Range Plan in 1979, the You and I Plan in 1982, and the Construction Plan of the
Industrial and Cultural Center in 1983. Every time the prefectural government had to
make a critical decision concerning the project, he took the initiative and decided the way
to go. When a way to invite private companies was under consideration, Hata denied the
recommended plan, the establishment of a third sector organization, although that method
was popular in Japan at that time, and cut a way to invent a new method to form a
public-private partnership. Hata also altered the prefectural organization to proceed with
the project. He created the Industrial Policy Office in 1982 as a section to deal with the
Sonic City project. Further, he established a number of inter-departmental committees
to stimulate discussion on the project. Hata's strong leadership affected even private
companies. He invited the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to open a
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showroom on the top of the office tower. Although it was the private developer's
responsibility to find tenants for private office space, a showroom included, he directly
asked TEPCO's president and obtained a positive answer from him. This was very
helpful for the developer because it was expected to be hard to find a tenant for the
showroom. This was because the tenant had to bear rents for the showroom, even though
such space might not directly contribute to business.
Another reason for a good partnership was that the prefectural government
understood its lacking of some expertise to get the project done. The prefectural
government would not be able to find private tenants satisfactorily and manage private
office space properly without help of experienced private companies, and it knew that.
The prefectural government also knew it was risky to run a hotel by itself. Knowing its
incapability, the prefectural government frequently consulted third parties about how to
proceed with the project. For example, it asked Urban Planning and Design Institute for
a report on the Sonic City in 1981 to make sure what functions were insufficient and
what features would be feasible in Omiya. It further conducted feasible studies with
Japan Research Institute for Social Development after 1983, and recognized that the Sonic
City would be more than a project it could do alone. Such an understanding made the
prefectural government sincerely consider what compromises it had to make to join hands
with private companies.
The prefectural government had also established clear objectives of the project, the
third reason for a good partnership. Each officials therefore could aim at the same end
even though the means to be taken may have been different. They shared information in
detail, and such a circumstance probably fostered the feeling of solidarity among
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prefectural officials.
Particular to the private sector, it is notable that the developer understood the
importance of paying regard to the public purpose. In making a proposal, NLI/Fujita paid
much attention to reduce adverse effects on the surrounding area. It reduced the height
of the office tower against the prefectural government's aspiration. But, this was to avoid
the serious problem of electric wave jamming that would have occurred otherwise. It also
tried to harmonize the Sonic City with an adjacent district. Hall exits were made to face
retail shops in the adjacent district in order to facilitate smooth pedestrian flows to such
shops after hall events.
Further, the developer understood that much information would be open to the
public. In many cases, private developers do not want to release information until the
project is completed. They want to hide especially financial and contractual information.
In the Sonic City project, however, much information had to be open because the project
was conducted jointly by the public sector and the prefectural government had to obtain
approvals from the local assembly. To enable open information, the two sectors had to
repeat negotiations with patience.
Additionally, the private developer was flexible in finance. Although the
prefectural government could receive 5,091 million yen from NLI as the land lease title
fee, it still had to pay 7,516 million yen to Fujita to obtain the entire part of the public
office and halls. 7,516 million yen was not a small amount for the prefectural
government to pay at once, and Fujita proposed 10 years' installments at prevailing prime
rates. NLI also fully paid the land lease title fee by the time the Sonic City was
completed. Without such an arrangement by the private sector, the prefectural
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government, suffering from a high burden of fixed costs, might not have been able to
finance the project.
Among factors that worked for both sectors, the establishment of the competition
jury seems to have been very crucial. Since the jury was a third party, it could
effectively maintain fairness in the designation process. And, supervised by a third party,
the two sectors could rely on each other. If such an organization had not existed, each
sector might have failed to make deals, being skeptical about the other's actions and
assertions. Remarkably, the jury mediated problems even during the construction period
under the name of the construction work supervisory committee. Every matter that might
raise a conflict was examined by the committee. Since the committee consisted of
authoritative members, its suggestions were highly appreciated. The two sectors generally
accepted suggestions without alteration, considering such suggestions were made from a
higher point of view.
The process of information sharing and consensus building was also important to
create the sense of mutual reliance, thus creating a good relationship between the two
sectors. Both sectors knew that they had to be patient as well as flexible to reach an
agreement satisfactory to both. Both sector respected the other's standpoint and sincerely
agreed not to embarrass the other. Consensus building in Japan is more likely to be a
bottom-to-up group exercise than in the US. People on the bottom or at the point of
action are more likely to be engaged in the consensus process. Decisions that reflect
once-reached consensus are therefore likely to be better informed because the analysis on
which the decisions are based draws on knowledge at all levels. And such a practice
encourages effective and expeditious action because people at all levels--having
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participated in shaping the decision--understand the decision and feel they have a stake
in making it work.
Lastly, it was important for the two sectors to separate responsibilities to each
sector. In the Sonic City project, the public sector was responsible for basic planning, site
assembly, and management of public office space and halls. The private sector, on the
other hand, was responsible for implementation planning, building construction, and
management of private office space and hotel. Originally, the prefectural government
planned to separate responsibilities to avoid troublesome office and hotel management.
Such separation, however, helped each sector demonstrate its real ability. For example,
the prefectural government successfully devised a way to finance the hall management
by combining it with office management. Fujita succeeded in reducing the construction
period by employing the up-down construction method and lived up to the prefectural
government's expectations. By assigning each responsibility to the most appropriate
party, a cooperation was better formulated in this project.
5. Several Issues to be Addressed to Improve Public-Private Partnerships in Japan
The public-private partnership fever seems to have cooled down in Japan. This
is because the urban development boom, which appeared in the mid 1980's, have been
declining as the government changed its attitude. The government now strictly deters real
estate developments to calm down the overheated real estate appreciation. About the
same time, the economic condition turned downward in Japan, and many private
companies began to exit the real estate market. Real estate has significantly reduced its
attractiveness as an investment vehicle, and private companies have cut down funds to be
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used for real estate investment. Under such circumstances, both public and private sectors
now face the necessity to reconsider how the public-private partnership should be like in
the future. In this last section, I would like to discuss issues that seem to be important
to improve the Japanese public-private partnership. Such issues include problems found
in the project competition method, efforts to maintain the public purpose in a project, and
the necessity to invite citizen groups to become involved in a project.
The Sonic City project clarified that a project competition contains several issues
to be attended to. First, maintaining fairness is very important in a project competition.
Fortunately, the competition jury did know how to deal with unexpected events that might
raise suspicion and criticism if poorly handled. When Fujita offered to discount the price
of public facilities, the jury manipulated it with such a capita idea: the jury would select
the best of the original proposals, and if NLI/Fujita's proposal was selected, the
prefectural government would purchase public facilities at the discounted price while
using the amount discounted for other public purposes. If the prefectural government had
accepted the discount offer as it was, it would have raised severe criticism, and the
competition might have resulted in a failure. This is because Fujita's offer was just like
a bidder changing its bid after he found the lowest bid. The jury's decision was correct
in avoiding this problem. This decision also allowed to utilize the amount discounted in
other use. Instead of bringing the offer to naught, the jury suggested to use it for
improvement of the site and the surrounding area.
Large costs to make a proposal also require consideration. Each group spent
approximately 20 - 30 million yen (US$ 100,000 - 150,000) to make a proposal even
without personnel expenses for the Sonic City project. However, once losing in the
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competition, losers could not gain anything. They could not recover even costs of the
proposal. Such a practice may make private developers consider it risky to participate
in a competition. Consequently, this method may limit the range of private developers,
allowing only large-scale companies with financial strength to make a proposal. Without
showing some kind of consideration to losers, the public sector may not be able to form
a real partnership but stay in the realm of the private company utilization.
Having reviewed major problems, I think that a project competition is a good
method only when the economic condition is brisk. If the economic condition is seriously
depressed, few private companies will make a proposal, whatever compromise the public
sector may make. Usually, the public sector overestimates the market rather than
underestimates, and even if the market obviously turns downward, it is generally hard for
private companies to change agreements that are already made with the public sector. For
this reason, it seems to be risky for private companies to participate in a project
competition when the economic condition is not brisk.
In considering the future partnerships, how to maintain the public purpose will be
another important issue. In the Sonic City project, the private developer paid attention
to the public purpose, considering how to connect the site with the station or how to
reduce construction-related problems. However, the public sector may not be able to
expect such considerations from private developers in other cases. This is because private
companies in Japan seems to be less dominated by philanthropy or willingness to
contribute to the community than in the US. In the US, there is a tradition that business
leaders are actively involved in civic affairs. Businesses often make philanthropic
contributions to community projects, such as orchestras, museums, universities, and
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community development corporations, helped by a special treatment that such
contributions are deductible from corporate income tax.3 However, there is little tradition
of corporate philanthropy and contribution to local communities in Japan. Also, even if
private companies make a contribution for the public purpose, such contributions are
hardly deductible for tax purposes in Japan. Accordingly, in many cases, private
developers face problems in balancing private profits and public interests. And, without
an incentive to make public contributions, private companies tend to seek for as large
profits as possible because the effect of public contributions are invisible and hardly
determined.
The last issue to be addressed is how to persuade citizen groups to be involved
in a project in the future. The public-private partnership has been formed only by the
public and private sectors in Japan. I think, however, that citizen groups have to be
added to the usual duality of public and private sectors. This is because they have to live
in the area even after the project is completed. Having to live with the consequence of
one's decision seems to be the best way to ensure serious discussion and decision-making.
Tunney F. Lee, professor at MIT, points out that projects are better designed, more
sensitive to its surroundings, more efficient, and better kept up by the participation of
citizen groups.4 A city can foster a stronger sense of community if its citizens feel more
in control of its physical environment through participation and ownership in nearby
projects.
In the Sonic City project, a hotel was added since a survey conducted by the
prefectural government clarified a residents' wish to have a first class hotel in the
prefecture. Also, the Omiya Station West Gate Area Big Project Council was established
121
under the initiative of local residents to deal with any problems that would occur related
to the ongoing construction work in the area. However, no citizen group had been
involved in planning, building design, or management processes. All crucial decisions
were made only by the prefectural government and the private developer, which was a
nation-wide company and had little particular interest in the area.
As earlier stated, a project is better shaped when those who have special concerns
are involved in it. In other words, when citizen groups becomes involved in a project for
the sake of the local community, the project becomes more preferable to the community
and will be appreciated for a long time. If such an idea is acceptable, public-private
projects should be more promoted in cities with a strong sense of community, cities that
are relatively independent, or cities that work as a regional core. And, helped by citizen
groups that seriously consider their own area, the public-private partnership may be better
employed to promote local and public interests, conducting, for example, mixed-use
developments that include facilities exclusively dedicated to local communities, such as
all-purpose halls, public libraries, or gymnasiums.
Bibliography
1. The Prefecture of Saitama, Saitama-Sangyo Bunka Center (Japanese), July 1986.
2. Bernard Frieden, et al, Government Roles in City Development in the United States, MIT
Center for Real Estate Development, June 1988.
3. R. Scott Fosler, Public-Private Partnership in the United States and Japan, A report to the
Housing and Urban Development Corporation of Japan, May 1991.
122
4. Tunney F. Lee, Citizen Participation in Development: The Case Study of the Boston
Region, A report contributed to a seminar on public-private partnerships in urban
development held by the City Planning Institute of Japan, November 1991.
123
